From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptfusion: Fix potential Spectre v1 Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 12:06:37 -0500 Message-ID: <20180723170637.GA19396@embeddedor.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Sathya Prakash , Chaitra P B , Suganath Prabu Subramani Cc: MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" List-Id: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org port can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:1360 mptctl_getiocinfo() warn: potential spectre issue 'ioc->pfacts' Fix this by sanitizing port before using it to index ioc->pfacts Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva --- drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c index 4470630..6751a40 100644 --- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c +++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ #include #include +/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */ +#include + #define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 1999-2008 LSI Corporation" #define MODULEAUTHOR "LSI Corporation" #include "mptbase.h" @@ -1306,7 +1309,7 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) kfree(karg); return -EINVAL; } - port = karg->hdr.port; + port = array_index_nospec(karg->hdr.port, 2); karg->port = port; pdev = (struct pci_dev *) ioc->pcidev; -- 2.7.4