From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
To: sathya.prakash@broadcom.com, chaitra.basappa@broadcom.com,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, martin.petersen@oracle.com
Cc: suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com,
MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main()
Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 09:10:30 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190530011030.GA6314@zhanggen-UX430UQ> (raw)
In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from
userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result
is saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is
fetched again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called,
'ioc' and 'karg' as inputs.
However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two
fetches, which will cause a potential security issues. Moreover, a
malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in
first fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch.
To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Ack-by: Suganath Prabu S <suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com>
---
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
index b2bb47c..5181c03 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
@@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg,
break;
}
+ if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) {
uarg = arg;
ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf);
next reply other threads:[~2019-05-30 1:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-30 1:10 Gen Zhang [this message]
2019-05-30 2:22 ` [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main() Martin K. Petersen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-05-27 0:57 Gen Zhang
2019-05-28 6:14 ` Suganath Prabu Subramani
2019-05-28 7:05 ` Gen Zhang
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