From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Yifei Gao" <gyf161023@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] scsi: target: use kref_get_unless_zero() in core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi()
Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2026 21:50:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804215008.2F1381F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804213726.3411698-1-gyf161023@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch addresses a kref revival race in `core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi()`, but identically flawed `kref_get()` patterns remain in `__core_scsi3_do_alloc_registration()` and `core_scsi3_check_aptpl_registration()`.
- [High] Fetching `tfc_sess` under RCU using a plain `kref_get()` in `ft_sess_get()` can revive a 0-refcount object, leading to a double free.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] scsi: target: use kref_get_unless_zero() in core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi() ---
commit 1ccb09531fbaa5b4a4d4c2e984295bc9d5b45e8e
Author: Yifei Gao <gyf161023@gmail.com>
scsi: target: use kref_get_unless_zero() in core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi()
This commit fixes a use-after-free vulnerability in core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi().
It replaces a plain kref_get() with kref_get_unless_zero() when acquiring a
reference to se_dev_entry under RCU. This prevents the revival of a 0-refcount
object during a concurrent teardown.
> diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_device.c b/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
> index 9db2201aa553f..bff97c6efffbe 100644
> --- a/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
> +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_device.c
> @@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ struct se_dev_entry *core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi(
> if (lun->lun_tpg->tpg_rtpi != rtpi)
> continue;
>
> - kref_get(&deve->pr_kref);
> + if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&deve->pr_kref))
> + continue;
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since this addresses a kref
revival race, could the same flaw exist in other places doing lockless RCU
lookups of se_dev_entry?
For example, drivers/target/target_core_pr.c:__core_scsi3_do_alloc_registration()
does:
kref_get(&pr_reg->pr_reg_deve->pr_kref);
rcu_read_unlock();
And similarly in drivers/target/target_core_pr.c:core_scsi3_check_aptpl_registration():
kref_get(&pr_reg->pr_reg_deve->pr_kref);
rcu_read_unlock();
If a concurrent disable path unhashes the entry and drops its final reference,
could a delayed reader executing the plain kref_get() resurrect the dying
object and cause a use-after-free when the disable path proceeds to free it
via call_rcu()?
[Severity: High]
This is another pre-existing issue, but while looking at plain kref_get()
usage under RCU, could a similar double-free issue occur in
drivers/target/tcm_fc/tfc_sess.c:ft_sess_get()?
kref_get(&sess->kref);
rcu_read_unlock();
If a teardown path (like handling a PRLO) calls ft_sess_delete() to unhash
the session and drops the final reference concurrently, could a reader
executing this plain kref_get() resurrect the session?
When the reader later drops its reference, would this lead to
target_remove_session() and kfree_rcu() executing a second time?
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> return deve;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260804213726.3411698-1-gyf161023@gmail.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 21:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 21:37 [PATCH] scsi: target: use kref_get_unless_zero() in core_get_se_deve_from_rtpi() Yifei Gao
2026-08-04 21:50 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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