From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Paolo Bonzini Subject: Ping^2 Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] add per-device sysfs knob to enable unrestricted, unprivileged SG_IO Date: Fri, 04 Jan 2013 19:48:14 +0100 Message-ID: <50E723EE.6070304@redhat.com> References: <1352827513-29890-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> <50CF2BE5.8070804@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <50CF2BE5.8070804@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alan Cox , James Bottomley , Jens Axboe , Ric Wheeler , Tejun Heo List-Id: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Il 17/12/2012 15:27, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto: > Il 13/11/2012 18:25, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto: >> > Privilege restrictions for SG_IO right now apply without distinction to >> > all devices, based on the single capability CAP_SYS_RAWIO. This is a very >> > broad capability, and makes it difficult to give SG_IO access to trusted >> > clients that need access to persistent reservations, trim/discard, or >> > vendor-specific commands. One problem here is that CAP_SYS_RAWIO allows >> > to escape a partition and issue commands that affect the full disk, >> > thus making DAC almost useless. >> > >> > For simplicity, this series attempts to solve one case only: you want >> > to pass through almost everything, but still run as confined as possible. >> > This is for example the case for virtualization, where more complex >> > filtering can be done just as easily in userspace, in the virtual >> > machine monitor. (This does mean the filter can be subverted if the >> > guest can escape the QEMU jail, but a more generic approach involving >> > a bitmap was NACKed). >> > >> > Ok for 3.8? > Ping... Jens, I haven't seen any pull request for 3.8 from you. Are > these patches on your radar? Tejun acked both of them. Ping^2. Paolo