From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
To: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>,
David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: "selinux@tycho.nsa.gov" <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] kernel: Add SELinux SCTP protocol support
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:26:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1482323213.7144.1.camel@btinternet.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161216134039.GD4731@localhost.localdomain>
On Fri, 2016-12-16 at 11:40 -0200, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 02:01:35PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> > From: Richard Haines
> > > Sent: 14 December 2016 13:40
> > > Add SELinux support for the SCTP protocol. The SELinux-sctp.txt
> > > document
> > > describes how the patch has been implemented with an example
> > > policy and
> > > tests using lkstcp-tools.
> >
> > ...
> > > +SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD - Allows additional bind addresses to be
> > > + associated after (optionally) calling
> > > bind(2)
> > > + if given the "bind_add" permission.
> >
> > Does restricting bindx make any sense at all?
> > The only addresses than can be specified are those of local
> > interfaces.
> > If bindx isn't called then the default is to include the addresses
> > of
> > all local interfaces.
> > So bindx only actually removes local addresses, it doesn't add
> > them.
>
> You could bind the socket while on a priviledged process and then
> drop
> the priviledges, like daemons do for binding on lower ports. Then the
> application wouldn't be able to bind on another address that it's not
> expected to.
>
> Marcelo
>
It appears from Marcelo's comments that keeping bindx_add/bindx_rem
would be useful. However I will rename the permissions to a single
permission of "bindx_addr" if that's okay.
Any more sctp specific comments gratefully received (SELinux/LSM as
well of course). I plan to issue an updated patch mid-late Jan '17.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-21 12:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-14 13:39 [RFC PATCH 1/1] kernel: Add SELinux SCTP protocol support Richard Haines
2016-12-14 14:01 ` David Laight
2016-12-16 13:40 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2016-12-21 12:26 ` Richard Haines [this message]
2016-12-14 17:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-12-16 13:31 ` Richard Haines
2016-12-14 18:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-01-23 13:19 ` Richard Haines
2017-01-23 18:58 ` marcelo.leitner
2016-12-21 16:09 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-02-06 14:30 ` Richard Haines
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