From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:41:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <05bf553f795ac93ea3032cfc1b56ca35fd6a920a.camel@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQLQswvu3oGyeevLrKMT200yD4hzCbkBUAs=1bKSDVaOQg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, 2022-11-16 at 08:16 -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 7:48 AM Roberto Sassu
> <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
> > +static bool is_ret_value_allowed(int ret, u32 ret_flags)
> > +{
> > + if ((ret < 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_NEG)) ||
> > + (ret == 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ZERO)) ||
> > + (ret == 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ONE)) ||
> > + (ret > 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_GT_ONE)))
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop
> > * function where a BPF program can be attached.
> > */
> > @@ -30,6 +41,15 @@ noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \
> > #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> > #undef LSM_HOOK
> >
> > +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
> > +noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME##_ret(int ret) \
> > +{ \
> > + return is_ret_value_allowed(ret, RET_FLAGS) ? ret : DEFAULT; \
> > +}
> > +
> > +#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> > +#undef LSM_HOOK
> > +
>
> because lsm hooks is mess of undocumented return values your
> "solution" is to add hundreds of noninline functions
> and hack the call into them in JITs ?!
I revisited the documentation and checked each LSM hook one by one.
Hopefully, I completed it correctly, but I would review again (others
are also welcome to do it).
Not sure if there is a more efficient way. Do you have any idea?
Maybe we find a way to use only one check function (by reusing the
address of the attachment point?).
Regarding the JIT approach, I didn't find a reliable solution for using
just the verifier. As I wrote to you, there could be the case where the
range can include positive values, despite the possible return values
are zero and -EACCES.
# ./test_progs-no_alu32 -t libbpf_get_fd
*reg = {type = SCALAR_VALUE, off = 0, {range = 0, {map_ptr = 0x0
<fixed_percpu_data>, map_uid = 0}, {btf = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
btf_id = 0}, mem_size = 0, dynptr = {type = BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID,
first_slot = false}, raw = {raw1 = 0, raw2 = 0}, subprogno = 0}, id =
0,
ref_obj_id = 0, var_off = {value = 0, mask = 18446744073709551603},
smin_value = -9223372036854775808, smax_value = 9223372036854775795,
umin_value = 0, umax_value = 18446744073709551603, s32_min_value =
-2147483648, s32_max_value = 2147483635, u32_min_value = 0,
u32_max_value = 4294967283, parent = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>, frameno
= 0, subreg_def = 0, live = REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, precise = false}
The JIT approach instead is 100% reliable, as you check the real value
to be returned to BPF LSM.
But of course, the performance will be worse this way. If you are able
to determine at verification time that an eBPF program is not going to
return illegal values, that would be better. I'm not sure it is
feasible.
Thanks
Roberto
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-16 16:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-15 17:56 [RFC][PATCH 0/4] security: Ensure LSMs return expected values Roberto Sassu
2022-11-15 17:56 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/4] lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 2:11 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-16 8:06 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 19:17 ` KP Singh
2022-11-16 19:27 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-15 17:56 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/4] lsm: Add missing return values doc in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 2:23 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-16 8:06 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 19:26 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-15 17:56 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/4] lsm: Redefine LSM_HOOK() macro to add return value flags as argument Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 2:27 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-16 8:11 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 22:04 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-17 5:49 ` Greg KH
2022-11-17 15:31 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-15 17:56 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/4] security: Enforce limitations on return values from LSMs Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 2:35 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-16 14:36 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 15:47 ` [PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 16:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-11-16 16:41 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2022-11-16 17:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-11-16 18:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-16 19:04 ` KP Singh
2022-11-16 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-30 13:52 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 17:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-16 19:02 ` KP Singh
2022-11-18 8:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-21 15:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-11-16 22:06 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/4] security: Enforce limitations on return values from LSMs Paul Moore
2022-11-15 18:41 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/4] security: Ensure LSMs return expected values Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=05bf553f795ac93ea3032cfc1b56ca35fd6a920a.camel@huaweicloud.com \
--to=roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com \
--cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=haoluo@google.com \
--cc=jackmanb@chromium.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.fastabend@gmail.com \
--cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=revest@chromium.org \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=sdf@google.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=yhs@fb.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).