Re: [PATCH] selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it

[Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>]

On Apr 26, 2026 David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
> a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
> initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
> dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Good catch, thanks.  These seems like a stable candidate so I've merged
it into selinux/stable-7.1 and we likely send it up to Linus later this
week.

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 97801966bf32..4ff118a9395f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  {
>  	const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
>  	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> -	struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
> +	struct xattr *xattr;
>  	u32 newsid, clen;
>  	u16 newsclass;
>  	int rc;
> @@ -2992,6 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
>  	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
>  		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  
> +	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
>  	if (xattr) {
>  		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
>  						   &context, &clen);
> 
> base-commit: 254f49634ee16a731174d2ae34bc50bd5f45e731
> -- 
> 2.53.0

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