From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0ef18e4236773f4ccd55f9b47639adb6a992d104.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com>
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1af7dec..5d81354 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -535,6 +535,32 @@ static inline bool is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
static inline bool is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+/*
+ * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ * 1) cap_effective has all caps
+ * 2) we are root
+ * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ */
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) {
+ if (!cap_full(effective, cred) ||
+ !is_eff(root, cred) || !is_real(root, cred) ||
+ !root_privileged()) {
+ ret = true;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -614,26 +640,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
- /*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
- *
- * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
- * 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
- * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
- * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
- *
- * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
- * that is interesting information to audit.
- */
- if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
- if (!cap_full(effective, new) ||
- !is_eff(root_uid, new) || !is_real(root_uid, new) ||
- !root_privileged()) {
- ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) {
+ ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
--
1.7.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-23 10:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-23 10:12 [PATCH V3 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 15:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:55 ` James Morris
2017-08-25 10:49 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 16:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 19:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-24 21:17 ` Paul Moore
2017-08-28 9:19 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-28 11:08 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-01 10:18 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-02 5:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-09-04 6:57 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-05 6:45 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:56 ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:58 ` James Morris
2017-08-28 12:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-31 14:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:59 ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 19:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 20:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-28 1:32 ` James Morris
2017-08-28 9:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-28 20:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-23 10:12 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2017-08-24 16:18 ` [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 6:01 ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris
2017-08-25 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-08-25 18:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-23 10:12 ` [PATCH V3 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:47 ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-24 16:44 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:48 ` James Morris
2017-08-23 10:13 ` [PATCH V3 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs
2017-08-24 16:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-08-25 5:50 ` James Morris
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