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From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 2021 13:50:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11b557b58de74828b1c16334a5fb52c4d3f6ad0f.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6306b4e5-f26d-1704-6344-354eb5387abf@linux.ibm.com>

On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 13:06 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 12/3/21 12:03, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Thu, 2021-12-02 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > [...]
> > >   static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
> > >   {
> > > +	int rc;
> > > +
> > > +	if (fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init) {
> > > +		rc = fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init(fc->user_ns);
> > > +		if (rc)
> > > +			return rc;
> > > +	}
> > >   	fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops;
> > >   	return 0;
> > >   }
> > I know I suggested this, but to get this to work in general, it's
> > going to have to not be specific to IMA, so it's going to have to
> > become something generic like a notifier chain.  The other problem
> > is it's only working still by accident:
> 
> I had thought about this also but the rationale was:
> 
> securityfs is compiled due to CONFIG_IMA_NS and the user namespace 
> exists there and that has a pointer now to ima_namespace, which can
> have that callback. I assumed that other namespaced subsystems could
> also be  reached then via such a callback, but I don't know.

Well securityfs is supposed to exist for LSMs.  At some point each of
those is going to need to be namespaced, which may eventually be quite
a pile of callbacks, which is why I thought of a notifier.

> I suppose any late filesystem init callchain would have to be
> connected to the user_namespace somehow?

I don't think so; I think just moving some securityfs entries into the
user_namespace and managing the notifier chain from within securityfs
will do for now.  [although I'd have to spec this out in code before I
knew for sure].

> > > +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
> > > +{
> > > +	ns->mount = securityfs_ns_create_mount(ns->user_ns);
> > This actually triggers on the call to securityfs_init_fs_context,
> > but nothing happens because the callback is null.  Every subsequent
> > use of fscontext will trigger this.  The point of a keyed supeblock
> > is that fill_super is only called once per key, that's the place we
> > should be doing this.   It should also probably be a blocking
> > notifier so anyconsumer of securityfs can be namespaced by
> > registering for this notifier.
> 
> What I don't like about the fill_super is that it gets called too
> early:
> 
> [   67.058611] securityfs_ns_create_mount @ 102 target user_ns: 
> ffff95c010698c80; nr_extents: 0
> [   67.059836] securityfs_fill_super @ 47  user_ns:
> ffff95c010698c80; 
> nr_extents: 0

Right, it's being activated by securityfs_ns_create_mount which is
called as soon as the user_ns is created.

> We are switching to the target user namespace in 
> securityfs_ns_create_mount. The expected nr_extents at this point is
> 0, since user_ns hasn't been configured, yet. But then
> security_fill_super is also called with nr_extents 0. We cannot use
> that, it's too early!

Exactly, so I was thinking of not having a securityfs_ns_create_mount
at all.  All the securityfs_ns_create.. calls would be in the notifier
call chain. This means there's nothing to fill the superblock until an
actual mount on it is called.

> > > +	if (IS_ERR(ns->mount)) {
> > > +		ns->mount = NULL;
> > > +		return -1;
> > > +	}
> > > +	ns->mount_count = 1;
> > This is a bit nasty, too: we're spilling the guts of mount count
> > tracking into IMA instead of encapsulating it inside securityfs.
> 
> Ok, I can make this disappear.
> 
> 
> > > +
> > > +	/* Adjust the trigger for user namespace's early teardown of
> > > dependent
> > > +	 * namespaces. Due to the filesystem there's an additional
> > > reference
> > > +	 * to the user namespace.
> > > +	 */
> > > +	ns->user_ns->refcount_teardown += 1;
> > > +
> > > +	ns->late_fs_init = ima_fs_ns_late_init;
> > > +
> > > +	return 0;
> > > +}
> > I think what should be happening is that we shouldn't so the
> > simple_pin_fs, which creates the inodes, ahead of time; we should
> > do it inside fill_super using a notifier, meaning it gets called
> > once per
> 
> fill_super would only work for the init_user_ns from what I can see.
> 
> 
> > key, creates the root dentry then triggers the notifier which
> > instantiates all the namespaced entries.  We can still use
> > simple_pin_fs for this because there's no locking across
> > fill_super.
> > This would mean fill_super would be called the first time the
> > securityfs is mounted inside the namespace.
> 
> I guess I would need to know how fill_super would work or how it
> could be called late/delayed as well.

So it would be called early in the init_user_ns by non-namespaced
consumers of securityfs, like it is now.

Namespaced consumers wouldn't call any securityfs_ns_create callbacks
to create dentries until they were notified from the fill_super
notifier, which would now only be triggered on first mount of
securityfs inside the namespace.

> > If we do it this way, we can now make securityfs have its own mount
> > and mount_count inside the user namespace, which it uses internally
> > to the securityfs code, thus avoiding exposing them to ima or any
> > other namespaced consumer.
> > 
> > I also think we now don't need the securityfs_ns_ duplicated
> > functions because the callback via the notifier chain now ensures
> > we can usethe namespace they were created in to distinguish between
> > non namespaced and namespaced entries.
> 
> Is there then no need to pass a separate vfsmount * in anymore? 

I don't think so no.  It could be entirely managed internally to
securityfs.

> Where would the vfsmount pointer reside? For now it's in
> ima_namespace, but it sounds like it should be in a more centralized
> place? Should it also be  connected to the user_namespace so we can
> pick it up using get_user_ns()?

exactly.  I think struct user_namespace should have two elements gated
by a #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS which are the vfsmount and the
mount_count for passing into simple_pin_fs.


James



  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-03 18:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-03  2:30 [RFC v2 00/19] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 01/19] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 02/19] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 03/19] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 04/19] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 05/19] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 06/19] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 07/19] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 08/19] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 09/19] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 10/19] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 11/19] securityfs: Prefix global variables with securityfs_ Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 12/19] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 13/19] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 14/19] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 16:40   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-03 17:39     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 16/19] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 17/19] userns: Introduce a refcount variable for calling early teardown function Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 18/19] ima/userns: Define early teardown function for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03  2:31 ` [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 15:07   ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 17:03   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 18:06     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 18:50       ` James Bottomley [this message]
2021-12-03 19:11         ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-04  0:33           ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 11:52             ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06  4:27           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:03             ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 14:11               ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 17:22                 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 19:37         ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-06 12:08           ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 13:38             ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:13               ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 15:44               ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 16:25                 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:11       ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:21         ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:42           ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:51             ` James Bottomley

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