From: labbott@redhat.com (Laura Abbott)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 10:10:13 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <13a50f85-bbd8-5d78-915a-a29c4a9f0c32@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5a83024c.64369d0a.a1e94.cdd6SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
On 02/13/2018 07:20 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote:
> Why alterations of page properties are not considered a risk and the physmap is?
> And how would it be easier (i suppose) to attack the latter?
Alterations are certainly a risk but with the physmap the
mapping is already there. Find the address and you have
access vs. needing to actually modify the properties
then do the access. I could also be complete off base
on my threat model here so please correct me if I'm
wrong.
I think your other summaries are good points though
and should go in the cover letter.
Thanks,
Laura
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-13 18:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-25 11:59 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-25 15:14 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-25 15:38 ` Jerome Glisse
2018-01-26 12:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 16:36 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-30 13:46 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 5:35 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-26 11:46 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:39 ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 15:38 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:57 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 20:12 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-03 20:32 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 22:29 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-04 15:05 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13 0:40 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 1:25 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13 3:39 ` Jann Horn
2018-02-13 16:09 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 21:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:06 ` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory) Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-14 20:13 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:48 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 22:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-14 22:27 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <5a83024c.64369d0a.a1e94.cdd6SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2018-02-13 18:10 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2018-02-20 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-05 15:40 ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:17 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 19:41 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:14 ` Ralph Campbell
2018-01-25 7:53 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
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