From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: tycho@docker.com (Tycho Andersen) Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 13:19:49 -0800 Subject: [PATCH v3] security/Kconfig: further restrict HARDENED_USERCOPY Message-ID: <1489094389-28007-1-git-send-email-tycho@docker.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org It doesn't make sense to have HARDENED_USERCOPY when either /dev/kmem is enabled or /dev/mem can be used to read kernel memory (i.e. !STRICT_DEVMEM). v2: add !MMU depend as well v3: drop !MMU, s/ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED/DEVMEM, which makes the above commit message actually match the logic again Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen CC: Kees Cook CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" CC: James Morris --- security/Kconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3ff1bf9..4619cee 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + depends on !DEVKMEM + depends on !DEVMEM || STRICT_DEVMEM select BUG help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html