From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Fri, 07 Apr 2017 03:46:20 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set In-Reply-To: <21572.1491548994@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <1491536950.4184.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20170407030545.GA4296@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <21572.1491548994@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Message-ID: <1491551180.4184.50.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Fri, 2017-04-07 at 08:09 +0100, David Howells wrote: > Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down()) > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > + > > > > > > > > IMA can be used to verify file signatures too, based on the LSM hooks > > in ?kernel_read_file_from_fd(). ?CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG should not be > > required. > > Okay, fair enough. I can stick in an OR with an IS_ENABLED on some IMA > symbol. CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC maybe? And also require IMA be enabled? Not quite, since as Dave pointed out, IMA is policy driven. ?As a policy is installed, we could set a flag. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html