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From: sds@tycho.nsa.gov (Stephen Smalley)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 09:58:39 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1492005519.3881.8.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPkE-bUsY8qD5xHU4VD-dxtAGxCGUhuQQmcS4kN0FyAozPRzhw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 2017-04-12 at 15:30 +0200, Sebastien Buisson wrote:
> 2017-04-12 13:55 GMT+02:00 Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>:
> > As currently written this code isn't something we would want to
> > merge
> > upstream for two important reasons:
> > 
> > * No abstraction layer at the LSM interface.??The core kernel code
> > should not call directly into any specific LSM, all interaction
> > should
> > go through the LSM hooks.
> 
> The idea behind this patch and the other one was to replicate what is
> done with selinux_is_enabled(). As I understand it now,
> selinux_is_enabled() should remain the only exception to the LSM
> hooks.
> So do you agree if I propose a new security_is_enforced() function at
> the LSM abstraction layer, which will be hooked to a
> selinux_is_enforced() function defined inside the SELinux LSM?

Even your usage of selinux_is_enabled() looks suspect; that should
probably go away.  Only other user of it seems to be some cred validity
checking that could be dropped as well.  The include/linux/selinux.h
interfaces were originally for use by audit and secmark when there were
no other LSMs and have gradually been removed.


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  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-12 13:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-12  9:06 [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 11:55 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-12 13:30   ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 13:58     ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2017-04-12 15:19       ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 16:33         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-13  0:12           ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-12 13:30   ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 14:35     ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 15:11       ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 16:24         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 17:07           ` Sebastien Buisson
2017-04-12 17:24             ` Stephen Smalley
2017-04-12 12:13 ` Stephen Smalley

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