From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Tue, 02 May 2017 15:01:22 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set In-Reply-To: <13679.1491830392@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <1491568577.4184.97.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1491551180.4184.50.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1491536950.4184.10.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <149142335441.5101.2294976563846442575.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20170407030545.GA4296@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <21572.1491548994@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <27362.1491556638@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13679.1491830392@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Message-ID: <1493751682.3680.11.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Hi David, On Mon, 2017-04-10 at 14:19 +0100, David Howells wrote: > Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > From an IMA perspective, either a file hash or signature are valid, > > but for this usage it must be a signature. > > Not necessarily. If IMA can guarantee that a module is the same based on its > hash rather than on a key, I would've thought that should be fine. File hashes can be modified on the running system, so they're normally used,?in conjunction with EVM, to detect off line modification of mutable files and prevent their usage. These patches https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/2/465?should provide some of the missing functionality. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html