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From: sds@tycho.nsa.gov (Stephen Smalley)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behavior
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 13:27:15 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1495214835.2209.15.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170519170932.67192-1-mka@chromium.org>

On Fri, 2017-05-19 at 10:09 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
> loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
> building with clang:
> 
> security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
> ????is not needed and will not be emitted
> ????[-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

> ---
> ?security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ----------------
> ?1 file changed, 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index e67a526d1f30..2e0227b0304f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -398,18 +398,6 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct
> super_block *sb)
> ?	kfree(sbsec);
> ?}
> ?
> -/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
> -
> -static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
> -	"uses xattr",
> -	"uses transition SIDs",
> -	"uses task SIDs",
> -	"uses genfs_contexts",
> -	"not configured for labeling",
> -	"uses mountpoint labeling",
> -	"uses native labeling",
> -};
> -
> ?static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
> ?{
> ?	return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
> @@ -524,10 +512,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
> *sb)
> ?		}
> ?	}
> ?
> -	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
> -		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type
> %s), unknown behavior\n",
> -		???????sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
> -
> ?	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
> ?	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
> ?		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
--
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-19 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-19 17:09 [PATCH] selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behavior Matthias Kaehlcke
2017-05-19 17:27 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2017-05-19 18:43 ` Paul Moore

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