From: danielmicay@gmail.com (Daniel Micay)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 19:40:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1496187633.17013.2.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <99069e11-dc84-8198-5d1c-f39b18ac9971@nmatt.com>
On Tue, 2017-05-30 at 19:00 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> On 5/30/17 4:22 PM, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > > Thanks, I didn't know that android was doing this. I still think
> > > this
> > > feature
> > > is worthwhile for people to be able to harden their systems
> > > against
> > > this attack
> > > vector without having to implement a MAC.
> >
> > Since there's a capable LSM hook for ioctl already, it means it
> > could go
> > in Yama with ptrace_scope but core kernel code would still need to
> > be
> > changed to track the owning tty. I think Yama vs. core kernel
> > shouldn't
> > matter much anymore due to stackable LSMs.
> >
>
> What does everyone think about a v8 that moves this feature under Yama
> and uses
> the file_ioctl LSM hook?
It would only make a difference if it could be fully contained there, as
in not depending on tracking the tty owner.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-30 23:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-29 21:37 [PATCH v7 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-05-29 21:37 ` [PATCH v7 1/2] security: tty: Add owner user namespace to tty_struct Matt Brown
2017-05-29 21:38 ` [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-05-29 22:26 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-29 23:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Boris Lukashev
2017-05-30 0:27 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 2:00 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 2:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 3:18 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 12:24 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 16:28 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 16:44 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-30 18:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-30 18:44 ` Nick Kralevich
2017-05-30 18:57 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 20:22 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-30 23:00 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 23:40 ` Daniel Micay [this message]
2017-05-30 23:59 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 22:51 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 23:19 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 23:56 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-01 2:35 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-01 13:08 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-01 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-01 21:26 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-01 18:58 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-01 21:24 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-02 14:46 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-02 15:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-02 16:02 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-02 16:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-02 17:32 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-02 18:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-02 19:22 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-02 19:25 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-02 19:26 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-02 20:05 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-02 20:11 ` Nick Kralevich
2017-06-02 20:46 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-03 22:00 ` Alan Cox
2017-06-03 22:22 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 3:37 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-30 15:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-05-30 16:09 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 6:29 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-05-31 2:48 ` James Morris
2017-05-31 4:10 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-30 0:15 ` Matt Brown
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