From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 06:18:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497003507.21594.177.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <94ba5ebb-952b-2037-799e-07306629a6f9@nmatt.com>
On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> >>
> >> *? Issues:
> >>??? *? Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run
> >>?????? malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code'
> >
> > What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but
> > having interpreters installed?
> >
>
> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While
> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a
> difference under the TPE threat model.
>
> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard
> problem for TPE.
You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I
posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the
python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts
themselves to be executed.
Mimi
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-09 10:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-08 3:43 [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Matt Brown
2017-06-08 3:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 2:38 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 3:50 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 10:18 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-06-09 12:55 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 13:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 13:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-16 2:25 ` [RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 2:25 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 18:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/1] " Alan Cox
2017-06-08 19:01 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-08 19:23 ` Alan Cox
[not found] ` <9d175249-c9f3-daba-bae4-f60dc97795e6@digikod.net>
2017-06-12 0:04 ` Matt Brown
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