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From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 09:44:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497015878.21594.201.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e92c4476-8480-1f35-1777-b6fb1400c462@nmatt.com>

On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 09:18 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> On 6/9/17 9:16 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 05:55 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>> On Thu, 2017-06-08 at 23:50 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> *  Issues:
> >>>>>>    *  Can be bypassed by interpreted languages such as python. You can run
> >>>>>>       malicious code by doing: python -c 'evil code'
> >>>>>
> >>>>> What's the recommendation for people interested in using TPE but
> >>>>> having interpreters installed?
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> If you don't need a given interpreter installed, uninstall it. While
> >>>> this is common sense system hardening it especially would make a
> >>>> difference under the TPE threat model.
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't have a knock down answer for this. Interpreters are a hard
> >>>> problem for TPE.
> >>>
> >>> You might be interested in the minor LSM named "shebang", that I
> >>> posted as a proof of concept back in January, which restricts the
> >>> python interactive prompt/interpreter, but allows the scripts
> >>> themselves to be executed.
> >>
> >> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9547405/
> >>
> >> Maybe these could be merged and the interpreter string could be made
> >> into a configurable list?
> > 
> > I updated shebang, but didn't bother to post it, as nobody seemed to
> > be interested at the time.  The updated version already has support
> > for the configurable list. Re-posting ...
> > 
> 
> That would be awesome. I think it's the perfect complement to TPE as it
> protects a key hole in its current threat model.

Hm, I hadn't looked at it in since January. ?It still needs to be
cleaned up and expanded a bit. ?The original version used a pathname
for identifying the interpreter. ?This version converts the list of
pathnames to a set of inodes, which is better, but now requires a
method for updating the inode number after a software update.

Please feel free to expand on it or re-use whatever you like.

Mimi

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-09 13:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-08  3:43 [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Matt Brown
2017-06-08  3:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09  3:50     ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 10:18       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 12:55         ` Kees Cook
2017-06-09 13:15           ` Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:16           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 13:18             ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-09 13:44               ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-06-16  2:25   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16  2:25   ` [RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 18:37 ` [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Alan Cox
2017-06-08 19:01   ` Matt Brown
2017-06-08 19:23     ` Alan Cox
     [not found]     ` <9d175249-c9f3-daba-bae4-f60dc97795e6@digikod.net>
2017-06-12  0:04       ` Matt Brown

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