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From: s.mesoraca16@gmail.com (Salvatore Mesoraca)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497286620-15027-4-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

Creation of a new LSM hook that can be used to authorize or deauthorize
new USB devices via the usb authorization interface.
The same hook can also prevent the authorization of a USB device via
"/sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized".
Using this hook an LSM could provide an higher level of granularity
than the current authorization interface.

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-usb at vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/core/hub.c    | 4 ++++
 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c  | 6 +++++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 7 +++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index b8bb20d..58be4f0 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/pm_qos.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -4831,6 +4832,9 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
 		if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT)
 			msleep(1000);
 
+		if (security_usb_device_auth(udev))
+			usb_deauthorize_device(udev);
+
 		/* consecutive bus-powered hubs aren't reliable; they can
 		 * violate the voltage drop budget.  if the new child has
 		 * a "powered" LED, users should notice we didn't enable it
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
index dfc68ed..fce9d39 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/usb.h>
 #include <linux/usb/quirks.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include "usb.h"
 
 /* Active configuration fields */
@@ -742,8 +743,11 @@ static ssize_t authorized_store(struct device *dev,
 		result = -EINVAL;
 	else if (val == 0)
 		result = usb_deauthorize_device(usb_dev);
-	else
+	else {
+		if (security_usb_device_auth(usb_dev))
+			return -EPERM;
 		result = usb_authorize_device(usb_dev);
+	}
 	return result < 0 ? result : size;
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(authorized, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index bd274db..cc0937e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1189,6 +1189,10 @@
  *	to the @parent process for tracing.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @usb_device_auth:
+ *	Check if @udev device should be authorized or not.
+ *	@udev contains the usb_device structure for the USB device.
+ *	Return 0 if the device is allowed.
  * @capget:
  *	Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
  *	the @target process.  The hook may also perform permission checking to
@@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@
 	int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child,
 					unsigned int mode);
 	int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent);
+	int (*usb_device_auth)(const struct usb_device *udev);
 	int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 	int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1670,6 +1675,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
 	struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
 	struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
+	struct list_head usb_device_auth;
 	struct list_head capget;
 	struct list_head capset;
 	struct list_head capable;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b5..19bc364 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/usb.h>
 
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct cred;
@@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 				  struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
+int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -434,6 +436,11 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 }
 
+static inline int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 				   kernel_cap_t *effective,
 				   kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 42c8028..e390f99 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -214,6 +214,11 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
 }
 
+int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(usb_device_auth, 0, udev);
+}
+
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		     kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		     kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-- 
1.9.1

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-12 16:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-12 16:56 [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-13  7:43     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-27 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-04 10:12     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca [this message]
2017-06-12 17:35   ` [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-13  7:47     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 19:38   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-13  7:50     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:51     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  1:15   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering Salvatore Mesoraca
     [not found]   ` <20170620070721.GA30728@amd>
2017-06-20  7:53     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:55     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  7:52     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-13  7:41     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  0:02   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
     [not found] ` <53a2d710-b0f0-cdf9-e7ad-cd8d03fc835a@digikod.net>
2017-07-10  7:59   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
     [not found]     ` <c19917fa-f62c-b7e0-8cbd-f10a96f686ba@digikod.net>
2017-07-11 16:58       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 17:49         ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 19:31           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 12:39             ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 15:19               ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 19:51                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 22:33                   ` Matt Brown
2017-07-24  0:58                   ` Casey Schaufler

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