From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 00:57:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499673451-66160-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1499673451-66160-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"),
the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in
flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior
changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and
fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing
execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead.
The comment is referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all
failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will
get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the
explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time.
This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being
installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(),
which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment
where installation is not actually happening.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 904199086490..7842ae661e34 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1285,7 +1285,14 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
- bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */
+ /*
+ * After clearing bprm->mm (to mark that current is using the
+ * prepared mm now), we are at the point of no return. If
+ * anything from here on returns an error, the check in
+ * search_binary_handler() will kill current (since the mm has
+ * been replaced).
+ */
+ bprm->mm = NULL;
set_fs(USER_DS);
current->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
@@ -1332,7 +1339,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
- /* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
@@ -1350,7 +1356,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
- /* install the new credentials */
if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
!gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-10 7:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-10 7:57 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-10 8:46 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:04 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <87pod8mdad.fsf@xmission.com>
2017-07-18 6:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:42 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier Kees Cook
2017-07-10 8:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:06 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <87bmosmcqv.fsf@xmission.com>
2017-07-11 2:07 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 6:45 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
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