From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 00:57:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499673451-66160-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1499673451-66160-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Like dumpability, clearing pdeath_signal happens both in setup_new_exec()
and later in commit_creds(). The test in setup_new_exec() is different
from all other privilege comparisons, though: it is checking the new cred
(bprm) uid vs the old cred (current) euid. This appears to be a bug,
introduced by commit a6f76f23d297 ("CRED: Make execve() take advantage of
copy-on-write credentials"):
- if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() ||
- bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ /* install the new credentials */
+ if (bprm->cred->uid != current_euid() ||
+ bprm->cred->gid != current_egid()) {
It was bprm euid vs current euid (and egids), but the effective got
dropped. Nothing in the exec flow changes bprm->cred->uid (nor gid).
The call traces are:
prepare_bprm_creds()
prepare_exec_creds()
prepare_creds()
memcpy(new_creds, old_creds, ...)
security_prepare_creds() (unimplemented by commoncap)
...
prepare_binprm()
bprm_fill_uid()
resets euid/egid to current euid/egid
sets euid/egid on bprm based on set*id file bits
security_bprm_set_creds()
cap_bprm_set_creds()
handle all caps-based manipulations
so this test is effectively a test of current_uid() vs current_euid(),
which is wrong, just like the prior dumpability tests were wrong.
The commit log says "Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on
certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds()." This
may be meaning the earlier old euid vs new euid (and egid) test that
got changed.
Luckily, as with dumpability, this is all masked by commit_creds()
which performs old/new euid and egid tests and clears pdeath_signal.
And again, like dumpability, we should include LSM secureexec logic for
pdeath_signal clearing. For example, Smack goes out of its way to clear
pdeath_signal when it finds a secureexec condition.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 3e519d4f0bd3..d7bda5b60e7b 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1361,8 +1361,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
- if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
- !gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
+ if (bprm->secureexec) {
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
} else {
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP)
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-10 7:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-10 7:57 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-10 8:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:04 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <87pod8mdad.fsf@xmission.com>
2017-07-18 6:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:42 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier Kees Cook
2017-07-10 8:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:06 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <87bmosmcqv.fsf@xmission.com>
2017-07-11 2:07 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 6:45 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
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