From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:25:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500416736-49829-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500416736-49829-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 22 +---------------------
security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 -
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 ---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 878407e023e3..1a1b1ec89d9d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -485,14 +485,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
* (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
- *
- * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
- * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
*/
if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
name, new_profile->base.hname);
- bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ bprm->secureexec = 1;
}
apply:
/* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
@@ -521,23 +518,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
/**
- * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
- * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
- */
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
- * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
- */
- if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
*/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index 30544729878a..2495af293587 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct aa_domain {
};
int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 38f821bf49b6..076ac4501d97 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ struct path;
#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
-/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
-#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
-
/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
struct path_cond {
kuid_t uid;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8f3c0f7aca5a..291c7126350f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -624,7 +624,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
};
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-18 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-18 22:25 [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-07-19 0:05 ` John Johansen
2017-07-19 1:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19 0:08 ` John Johansen
2017-07-19 1:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19 4:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19 9:19 ` James Morris
2017-07-19 23:56 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-19 0:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook John Johansen
2017-07-19 9:21 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] selinux: " Kees Cook
2017-07-20 0:03 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20 0:19 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20 1:37 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 13:42 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20 17:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 20:42 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 15:40 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 17:37 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-21 19:16 ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-07-26 3:58 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-26 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-07-19 1:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19 4:41 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 4:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 22:43 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 13:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19 9:26 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19 1:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19 9:28 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-19 0:02 ` John Johansen
2017-07-19 9:29 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-19 0:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-26 3:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-19 9:42 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 23:03 ` [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Linus Torvalds
2017-07-19 3:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-19 5:23 ` Kees Cook
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