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From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/15] selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:25:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1500416736-49829-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500416736-49829-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

The SELinux bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).

Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 +++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0f1450a06b02..18038f73a2f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2413,30 +2413,17 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 		/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
 		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-	u32 sid, osid;
-	int atsecure = 0;
-
-	sid = tsec->sid;
-	osid = tsec->osid;
 
-	if (osid != sid) {
 		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
 		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
 		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
-		atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
-					SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
+				  NULL);
+		bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
 	}
 
-	return !!atsecure;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
@@ -6151,7 +6138,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
-- 
2.7.4

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-18 22:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-18 22:25 [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:05   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  1:01   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:08   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  1:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  4:40     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19  9:19   ` James Morris
2017-07-19 23:56   ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:00   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  9:21   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-20  0:03   ` [PATCH v3 04/15] selinux: " Paul Moore
2017-07-20  0:19     ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20  1:37       ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 13:42         ` Paul Moore
2017-07-20 17:06           ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20 20:42             ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 15:40               ` Paul Moore
2017-07-21 17:37                 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-21 19:16                   ` Paul Moore
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-07-26  3:58   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-26 15:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-07-19  1:10   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  4:41     ` Kees Cook
2017-07-20  4:53     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 22:43       ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 13:12         ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  9:26   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-19  1:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-19  9:28   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:02   ` John Johansen
2017-07-19  9:29   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-19  0:45   ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-26  3:59   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-19  9:42   ` James Morris
2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-18 23:03 ` [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Linus Torvalds
2017-07-19  3:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-19  5:23   ` Kees Cook

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