From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 02/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 12:16:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1501614998-62619-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501614998-62619-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"),
the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in
flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior
changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and
fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing
execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead.
The comment was referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all
failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will
get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the
explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time, and add
details about the true nature of "point of no return" being the call
to flush_old_exec() itself.
This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being
installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(),
which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment
where installation is not actually happening.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
fs/exec.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a0fff86269e4..26b98072be50 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1259,6 +1259,12 @@ void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec)
perf_event_comm(tsk, exec);
}
+/*
+ * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
+ * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
+ * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
+ * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handlers (see below).
+ */
int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
int retval;
@@ -1286,7 +1292,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
- bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */
+ /*
+ * After clearing bprm->mm (to mark that current is using the
+ * prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original
+ * process. If anything from here on returns an error, the check
+ * in search_binary_handler() will SEGV current.
+ */
+ bprm->mm = NULL;
set_fs(USER_DS);
current->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
@@ -1333,7 +1345,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
- /* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
@@ -1351,7 +1362,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
- /* install the new credentials */
if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
!gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-01 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-01 19:16 [PATCH v5 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/15] selinux: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
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