From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 12:16:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1501614998-62619-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501614998-62619-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 19 +------------------
security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 1 -
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 3 ---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 67ec52cfc523..17a601c67b62 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC);
dbg_printk("\n");
}
- bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ bprm->secureexec = 1;
}
if (label->proxy != new->proxy) {
@@ -843,23 +843,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
goto done;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
- * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
- */
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
- * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
- */
- if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* Functions for self directed profile change
*/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index bab5810b6e9a..24c5976d6143 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ struct aa_domain {
#define AA_CHANGE_STACK 8
int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 001e40073ff9..4c2c8ac8842f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -101,9 +101,6 @@ static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_file_label(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
-/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
-#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
-
/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
struct path_cond {
kuid_t uid;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 867bcd154c7e..7a82c0f61452 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -694,7 +694,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
};
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-01 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-01 19:16 [PATCH v5 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/15] selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01 19:16 ` [PATCH v5 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
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