From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 20:19:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1501730353-46840-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501730353-46840-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Both the upcoming logging improvements and changes to RET_KILL will need
to know which filter a given seccomp return value originated from. In
order to delay logic processing of result until after the seccomp loop,
this adds a single pointer assignment on matches. This will allow both
log and RET_KILL logic to work off the filter rather than doing more
expensive tests inside the time-critical run_filters loop.
Running tight cycles of getpid() with filters attached shows no measurable
difference in speed.
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 98b59b5db90b..8bdcf01379e4 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -171,10 +171,12 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
/**
* seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
* @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
+ * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ struct seccomp_filter **match)
{
struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
@@ -198,8 +200,10 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd);
- if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
+ if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) {
ret = cur_ret;
+ *match = f;
+ }
}
return ret;
}
@@ -566,6 +570,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
+ struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
int data;
/*
@@ -574,7 +579,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
*/
rmb();
- filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd);
+ filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
--
2.7.4
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-03 3:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-03 3:19 [PATCH 0/4] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS Kees Cook
2017-08-03 3:19 ` Kees Cook [this message]
[not found] ` <b1441a9f-acf0-3133-d70e-ea62564cc321@canonical.com>
2017-08-08 1:46 ` [PATCH 1/4] seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection Kees Cook
2017-08-03 3:19 ` [PATCH 2/4] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS Kees Cook
[not found] ` <84366abd-bf72-83be-ce42-be5332300eb2@canonical.com>
2017-08-08 1:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-03 3:19 ` [PATCH 3/4] selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests Kees Cook
2017-08-03 3:19 ` [PATCH 4/4] selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing Kees Cook
[not found] ` <2185ad3f-2a08-09b9-2df6-1fa5853506d7@canonical.com>
2017-08-08 1:37 ` Kees Cook
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