From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14
Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 02:46:24 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1505025984.3224.35.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFw8wgA+jhBOhnY-TSdbPgiYcrFiipCV=rsS1=GQEN+JgQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2017-09-07 at 11:19 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 3:29 AM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> >
> > IMA:
> > - A new integrity_read file operation method, avoids races when
> > calculating file hashes
>
> Honestly, this seems really odd.
>
> It documents that it needs to be called with i_rwsem held exclusively,
> and even has a lockdep assert to that effect (well, not really: the
> code claims "exclusive", but the lockdep assert does not), but I'm not
> actually seeing anybody doing it.
>
> Quite the reverse, I just see integrity_read_file() doing filp_open()
> on the pathname and passing it to integrity_kernel_read() with no
> locking.
>
> It really looks like just pure garbage to me. I pulled, and I'm not
> unpulling the whole thing. I don't think it's been tested, and I don't
> think it can be right.
>
> Tell me why I'm wrong, or tell me why that garbage made it in in the
> first place?
I'm really sorry for the long delay in responding. ?I've been on
vacation the last week, mostly without cell phone and very limited
wifi access.?
True, there is a side case where integrity_read_file() is being called
without first taking the i_rwsem. ?This side case permits signed x509
certificates to be loaded onto the trusted IMA/EVM keyrings, without
verifying the file signature stored as security.ima/security.evm
xattrs. ?Basically, the xattr signatures can not be verified until the
keys are loaded. ?The main use case is embedded systems which do not
have an initramfs, but have a specially crafted init script. ?It
requires enabling CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 or CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509. ?The
new VFS integrity_read() file operation method would not be called.
The main use case for the new VFS integrity_read() file operation
method is to calculate the file hash, as Christoph described.
Mimi
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-10 6:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-04 10:29 [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14 James Morris
2017-09-07 18:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-09-08 4:48 ` James Morris
2017-09-08 7:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-08 17:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-09-08 17:36 ` Paul Moore
2017-09-10 4:32 ` James Morris
2017-09-10 4:53 ` James Morris
2017-09-11 22:30 ` Paul Moore
2017-09-14 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-14 21:13 ` James Morris
2017-09-14 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-08 19:57 ` James Morris
2017-09-17 7:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-09-10 8:10 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-10 14:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-09-11 6:38 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-11 21:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-09-08 22:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-10 2:08 ` James Morris
2017-09-10 7:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-09-10 12:17 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-10 6:46 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1505025984.3224.35.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).