From: lkundrak@v3.sk (Lubomir Rintel)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: check CAP_SETFCAP for a particular inode & mapped user
Date: Mon, 09 Oct 2017 20:14:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1507572892.23600.10.camel@v3.sk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171005064826.GA11630@mail.hallyn.com>
On Thu, 2017-10-05 at 01:48 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 05, 2017 at 08:16:11AM +0200, Lubomir Rintel wrote:
> > This allows setting "security.capability" xattr by a user that has
> > CAP_SETFCAP in an userns with SELinux. Namespaced capabilities are
> > supported, as of commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file
> > capabilities").
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
>
> The fix is already on its way into the kernel - see the thread at
> https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=150713903925728&w=2
Thanks for the response. I'm wondering if there are chances this could
go to 4.14, given the patch that got merged seems reasonably self-
contained, quite useful, and the release is going to be a long-term
one.
If rc5 is too late for such changes, are there changes it could perhaps
go to a subsequent -stable release?
Thanks,
Lubo
>
> Thanks though :)
>
> -serge
>
> > ---
> > A casual warning: Please not assume I know what I'm really doing. I
> > can now
> > install iputils and /bin/ping in a LXC container, which is great,
> > but I
> > typically wouldn't be allowed anywhere near anything security
> > related.
> >
> > Thank you!
> >
> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index f5d304736852..7bc5f4ffb4e0 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -3127,11 +3127,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const
> > struct path *path)
> > static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > const char *name)
> > {
> > const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> >
> > if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> > sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
> > if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> > - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> > + if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
> > CAP_SETFCAP))
> > return -EPERM;
> > } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> > /* A different attribute in the security
> > namespace.
> > --
> > 2.13.6
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-09 18:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-05 6:16 [PATCH] selinux: check CAP_SETFCAP for a particular inode & mapped user Lubomir Rintel
2017-10-05 6:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-10-09 18:14 ` Lubomir Rintel [this message]
2017-10-09 18:21 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1507572892.23600.10.camel@v3.sk \
--to=lkundrak@v3.sk \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).