[PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on untrusted filesystems

[zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)]

> > > On the flip side when it really is a trusted mounter, and it is in a
> > > configuration that IMA has a reasonable expectation of seeing all of
> > > the changes it would be nice if we can say please trust this mount.
> > 
> > IMA has no way of detecting file change. ?This was one of the reasons
> > for the original patch set's not using the cached IMA results.
> > 
> > Even in the case of a trusted mounter and not using IMA cached
> > results, there are no guarantees that the data read to calculate the
> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read. ?In some
> > environments this might be an acceptable risk, while in others not.
> 
> So for the cases where it's not, there should be an IMA option or policy
> to say any SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES mounts should be not
> trusted, with the default being both SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and
> SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER must be true to not trust, right?

Right. ?To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:
1. Fail signature verification on unprivileged non-init root mounted
file systems.

flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER
(always enabled)

2. Permit signature verification on privileged file system mounts in a
secure system environment. ?Willing to accept the risk. ?Does not rely
on cached integrity results, but forces re-evaluation.

flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES, not SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER or
IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFICABLE_SIGNATURES (default behavior)

3. Fail signature verification also on privileged file system mounts.
Fail safe, unwilling to accept the risk.

flags:
SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES

Enabled by specifying "ima_policy=unverifiable_sigs" on the boot
command line.

Mimi

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