From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/4] unverifiable file signatures
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 15:24:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520540650-7451-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
For local filesystems, the kernel prevents files being executed from
being modified. With IMA-measurement enabled, the kernel also emits
audit "time of measure, time of use" messages for files opened for
read, and subsequently opened for write.
Files on fuse are initially measured, appraised, and audited. Although
the file data can change dynamically any time, making re-measuring,
re-appraising, or re-auditing pointless, this patch set attempts to
differentiate between unprivileged non-init root and privileged
mounted fuse filesystems.
This patch set addresses three different scenarios:
- Unprivileged non-init root mounted fuse filesystems are untrusted.
Signature verification should always fail and re-measuring,
re-appraising, re-auditing files makes no sense.
Always enabled.
- For privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure" environment, with a
correctly enforced security policy, which is willing to assume the
inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems, it is reasonable to
re-measure, re-appraise, and re-audit files.
Enabled by default to prevent breaking existing systems.
- Privileged mounted filesystems unwilling to assume the risks and
prefers to securely fail safe.
Enabled based on policy.
Changelog v3:
- Fix SB_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER test.
- Rename the builtin policy name to "fail_securely".
Mimi
Mimi Zohar (4):
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++++-
fs/fuse/inode.c | 3 +++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++++
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--
2.7.5
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next reply other threads:[~2018-03-08 20:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-08 20:24 Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-12 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 18:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged " Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 19:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-12 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-13 19:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 14:46 ` Stefan Berger
2018-03-14 14:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-14 14:37 ` Stefan Berger
2018-03-13 19:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-19 11:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-14 7:52 ` Stef Bon
2018-03-14 13:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-14 16:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 17:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-14 18:08 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-14 19:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 20:34 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-14 21:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 22:53 ` Michael Halcrow
2018-03-15 21:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-15 10:07 ` Stef Bon
2018-03-15 13:53 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-15 22:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-13 19:40 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] unverifiable file signatures Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-13 20:40 ` Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1520540650-7451-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).