[PATCH 3/4] ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()

[zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)]

On Wed, 2018-03-14 at 21:03 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Hello Serge,
> 
> Thanks for quickly reviewing these patches!
> 
> Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> 
> > Quoting Thiago Jung Bauermann (bauerman at linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >> @@ -241,16 +241,20 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >>  	}
> >>  
> >>  	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> >> -	if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
> >> -	    (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
> >> -	    (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> >> -		if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> >> -		    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> >> -			cause = "missing-HMAC";
> >> -		else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
> >> -			cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> >> +	switch (status) {
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
> >
> > Wouldn't it be more future-proof to replace this with a 'default', or
> > to at least add a "default: BUG()" to catch new status values?
> 
> I agree. I like the "default: BUG()" option.

Agreed. ?I would put it at the end after INTEGRITY_FAIL.

> 
> >> +		break;
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS:	/* No EVM protected xattrs. */
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:		/* No security.evm xattr. */
> >> +		cause = "missing-HMAC";
> >> +		goto out;
> >> +	case INTEGRITY_FAIL:		/* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
> >> +		cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> >>  		goto out;
> >>  	}
> >> +
> >>  	switch (xattr_value->type) {
> >>  	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
> >>  		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
> >> @@ -316,17 +320,20 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >>  		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
> >>  				    op, cause, rc, 0);
> >>  	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
> >> +		/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
> >>  		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
> >>  		    (!xattr_value ||
> >>  		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
> >>  			if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
> >>  				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> >> -		} else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
> >> -			   (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
> >> -			   (xattr_value &&
> >> -			    xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
> >> +		}
> >> +
> >> +		/* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */
> >> +		if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
> >
> > This may be correct, but it's not identical to what you're replacing.
> > Since in either case you're setting status to INTEGRITY_PASS the final
> > result is the same, but with a few extra possible steps.  Not sure
> > whether that matters.
> 
> Good point. I'll have to defer this one to Mimi though.

The end result is the same, but add some needed comments.

Mimi

> 
> >
> >> +		    xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
> >>  			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> >>  		}
> >> +
> >>  		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
> >>  				    op, cause, rc, 0);
> >>  	} else {
> 
> 

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