From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1530542283-26145-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Hi Eric, Can I get your Ack on this patch? Mimi On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load > and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must > call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() > in the original kexec_load syscall. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: David Howells > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html