From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 485C2C00449 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 11:20:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1915320841 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 11:20:51 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1915320841 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727033AbeJHScE (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Oct 2018 14:32:04 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:34526 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726967AbeJHScE (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Oct 2018 14:32:04 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w98BJPMP038784 for ; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 07:20:48 -0400 Received: from e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.103]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2n031r3a0n-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 08 Oct 2018 07:20:48 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 8 Oct 2018 12:20:38 +0100 Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.59]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w98BKbqn197054 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Mon, 8 Oct 2018 11:20:37 GMT Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id AEBF8A4057; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 14:20:11 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80064A4053; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 14:20:10 +0100 (BST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.101.74]) by d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 8 Oct 2018 14:20:10 +0100 (BST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for architecture specific IMA policies From: Mimi Zohar To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Nayna Jain Date: Mon, 08 Oct 2018 07:20:25 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20181005174015.21939-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20181005174015.21939-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18100811-0028-0000-0000-0000030402DC X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18100811-0029-0000-0000-000023BE4EAD Message-Id: <1538997625.15382.87.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-10-08_03:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=896 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1810080113 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Fri, 2018-10-05 at 23:10 +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > From: Nayna Jain > > The architecture specific policy, introduced in this patch set, permits > different architectures to define IMA policy rules based on kernel > configuration and system runtime information. > > For example, on x86, there are two methods of verifying the kexec'ed kernel > image signature - CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG and IMA appraisal policy > KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK. CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enforces the kexec_file_load > syscall to verify file signatures, but does not prevent the kexec_load > syscall. The IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule verifies the kexec'ed > kernel image, loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall, is validly signed and > prevents loading a kernel image via the kexec_load syscall. When secure > boot is enabled, the kexec'ed kernel image needs to be signed and the > signature verified. In this environment, either method of verifying the > kexec'ed kernel image is acceptable, as long as the kexec_load syscall is > disabled. > > The previous version of this patchset introduced a new IMA policy rule to > disable the kexec_load syscall, when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG was enabled, > however that is removed from this version by introducing a different > mechanism, as described below. > > The patchset defines an arch_ima_get_secureboot() function to retrieve the > secureboot state of the system. If secureboot is enabled and > CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured, it denies permission to kexec_load > syscall. > > To support architecture specific policies, a new function > arch_get_ima_policy() is defined. This patch set defines IMA > KERNEL_KEXEC_POLICY rules for x86 *only* if CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is > disabled and secure boot is enabled. > > This patch set includes a patch, which refactors ima_init_policy() to > remove code duplication. Other than a couple of #ifdef's in .c files, which should be converted to use IS_ENABLED(), the patch set is looking really good. thanks! Mimi