From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.9 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 252FFC65BAF for ; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E48C720661 for ; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:32 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org E48C720661 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726201AbeLISkS (ORCPT ); Sun, 9 Dec 2018 13:40:18 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:37258 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726219AbeLISkS (ORCPT ); Sun, 9 Dec 2018 13:40:18 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id wB9Id7gI095242 for ; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 13:40:17 -0500 Received: from e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.103]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2p8uqwcvws-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Sun, 09 Dec 2018 13:40:17 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:10 -0000 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id wB9Ie9pN852324 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:09 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17D6EAE057; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:09 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71F4BAE045; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:07 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.88.113]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Sun, 9 Dec 2018 18:40:07 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA From: Mimi Zohar To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2018 13:39:56 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20181208202705.18673-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20181208202705.18673-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18120918-0028-0000-0000-0000032829AB X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18120918-0029-0000-0000-000023E448D4 Message-Id: <1544380796.3794.6.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-12-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1812090173 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hi Nayna, On Sun, 2018-12-09 at 01:56 +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. > In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is possible that the new kernel image is signed with third party keys > which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The > kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform/firmware keys. > > The secure boot key database is expected to store the keys as EFI > Signature List(ESL). The patch set uses David Howells and Josh Boyer's > patch to access and parse the ESL to extract the certificates and load > them onto the platform keyring. > > The last patch in this patch set adds support for IMA-appraisal to > verify the kexec'ed kernel image based on keys stored in the platform > keyring. Thanks!  This patch set is now in the #next-integrity branch. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git/ Mimi