From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1546FC43218 for ; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27974206C0 for ; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388137AbfDYVqN (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:46:13 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:59548 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388136AbfDYVqN (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:46:13 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x3PLY6Oo036002 for ; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:46:11 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2s3kq2au0c-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:46:11 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 25 Apr 2019 22:46:04 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x3PLk38I61145270 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:03 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36671AE053; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:03 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5C44AE045; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:00 +0000 (GMT) Received: from rapoport-lnx (unknown [9.148.204.209]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Thu, 25 Apr 2019 21:46:00 +0000 (GMT) Received: by rapoport-lnx (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:45:59 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexandre Chartre , Andy Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , Jonathan Adams , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Mike Rapoport Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:45:47 +0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19042521-0020-0000-0000-000003360BFD X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19042521-0021-0000-0000-000021887A3B Message-Id: <1556228754-12996-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-04-25_18:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=538 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1904250133 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hi, Address space isolation has been used to protect the kernel from the userspace and userspace programs from each other since the invention of the virtual memory. Assuming that kernel bugs and therefore vulnerabilities are inevitable it might be worth isolating parts of the kernel to minimize damage that these vulnerabilities can cause. The idea here is to allow an untrusted user access to a potentially vulnerable kernel in such a way that any kernel vulnerability they find to exploit is either prevented or the consequences confined to their isolated address space such that the compromise attempt has minimal impact on other tenants or the protected structures of the monolithic kernel. Although we hope to prevent many classes of attack, the first target we're looking at is ROP gadget protection. These patches implement a "system call isolation (SCI)" mechanism that allows running system calls in an isolated address space with reduced page tables to prevent ROP attacks. ROP attacks involve corrupting the stack return address to repoint it to a segment of code you know exists in the kernel that can be used to perform the action you need to exploit the system. The idea behind the prevention is that if we fault in pages in the execution path, we can compare target address against the kernel symbol table. So if we're in a function, we allow local jumps (and simply falling of the end of a page) but if we're jumping to a new function it must be to an external label in the symbol table. Since ROP attacks are all about jumping to gadget code which is effectively in the middle of real functions, the jumps they induce are to code that doesn't have an external symbol, so it should mostly detect when they happen. This is very early POC, it's able to run the simple dummy system calls and a little bit beyond that, but it's not yet stable and robust enough to boot a system with system call isolation enabled for all system calls. Still, we wanted to get some feedback about the concept in general as early as possible. At this time we are not suggesting any API that will enable the system calls isolation. Because of the overhead required for this, it should only be activated for processes or containers we know should be untrusted. We still have no actual numbers, but surely forcing page faults during system call execution will not come for free. One possible way is to create a namespace, and force the system calls isolation on all the processes in that namespace. Another thing that came to mind was to use a seccomp filter to allow fine grained control of this feature. The current implementation is pretty much x86-centric, but the general idea can be used on other architectures. A brief TOC of the set: * patch 1 adds definitions of X86_FEATURE_SCI * patch 2 is the core implementation of system calls isolation (SCI) * patches 3-5 add hooks to SCI at entry paths and in the page fault handler * patch 6 enables the SCI in Kconfig * patch 7 includes example dummy system calls that are used to demonstrate the SCI in action. Mike Rapoport (7): x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification security: enable system call isolation in kernel config sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 65 ++++ arch/x86/entry/common.c | 65 ++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 13 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/sci.h | 55 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 5 + arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 28 ++ arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/sci.c | 608 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/sched.h | 5 + include/linux/sci.h | 12 + kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/exit.c | 3 + kernel/sci-examples.c | 52 +++ security/Kconfig | 10 + 21 files changed, 956 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sci.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/sci.c create mode 100644 include/linux/sci.h create mode 100644 kernel/sci-examples.c -- 2.7.4