From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [v5.19.y PATCH 3/3] Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd
Date: Tue, 06 Sep 2022 17:03:54 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166249823441.409408.621539815259290208.stgit@olly> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166249766105.409408.12118839467847524983.stgit@olly>
Backport the following upstream commit into Linux v5.19.y:
commit dd9373402280cf4715fdc8fd5070f7d039e43511
Author: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue Aug 23 16:46:18 2022 -0700
Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd
Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6207762dbdb1..b30e20f64471 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
@@ -4739,6 +4740,36 @@ static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
return -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
+ * @ioucmd: the command in question
+ *
+ * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
+ * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
+ * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4896,6 +4927,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
#endif
};
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-06 21:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-06 21:03 [v5.19.y PATCH 0/3] Backport the io_uring/LSM CMD passthrough controls Paul Moore
2022-09-06 21:03 ` [v5.19.y PATCH 1/3] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op Paul Moore
2022-09-06 21:03 ` [v5.19.y PATCH 2/3] selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook Paul Moore
2022-09-06 21:03 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2022-09-06 21:25 ` [v5.19.y PATCH 3/3] Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd Casey Schaufler
2022-09-11 11:36 ` [v5.19.y PATCH 0/3] Backport the io_uring/LSM CMD passthrough controls Greg KH
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