From: Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 11:33:04 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <16c8baf7-e2a9-6e12-b736-a0e2384282ed@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1542648844.2910.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
On 11/19/2018 12:34 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
> 2. At some point in time the attacker could reset the TPM, clearing
> the PCRs and then send down their own measurements which would
> effectively overwrite the boot time measurements the TPM has
> already done.
> [snip]
> However, the second can only really be detected by relying
> on some sort of mechanism for protection which would change over TPM
> reset.
FYI: TPM 2.0 has a resetCount that can be used to detect, but not
protect against, this attack.
> Every TPM comes shipped with a couple of X.509 certificates for the
> primary endorsement key. This document assumes that the Elliptic
> Curve version of the certificate exists at 01C00002, but will work
> equally well with the RSA certificate (at 01C00001).
A nit. The RSA cert is at 01c00002. The ECC cert is at 01c0000a.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-10 16:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 17:34 Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks James Bottomley
2018-11-19 20:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 20:20 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 21:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 21:34 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 21:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 22:36 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 23:08 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 0:54 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 3:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 17:17 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 21:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 22:34 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-21 2:24 ` EXTERNAL: " Jeremy Boone
2018-11-21 5:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 23:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 23:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 11:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 12:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 17:25 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 23:58 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-21 0:33 ` EXTERNAL: " Jeremy Boone
2018-11-21 6:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 5:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-21 7:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <F10185EF-C618-45DC-B1F3-0053B8FE417F@gmail.com>
2018-11-21 9:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 9:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 17:23 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-10 16:33 ` Ken Goldman [this message]
2018-12-10 17:30 ` James Bottomley
2018-12-11 21:47 ` Ken Goldman
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