linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v17 05/21] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs()
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 17:55:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1712969764-31039-6-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1712969764-31039-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.

Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.

This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.

Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

---
v1-v11:
  + Not present

v12:
  + Introduced

v13:
  + Rename the hook name to initramfs_populated()

v14:
  + No changes

v15:
  + No changes

v16:
  + No changes

v17:
  + Fix ocumentation style issues
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h      |  8 ++++++++
 init/initramfs.c              |  3 +++
 security/security.c           | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 334e00efbde4..7db99ae75651 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -450,3 +450,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 41a8f667bdfa..14fff542f2e3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2255,4 +2255,12 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+extern void security_initramfs_populated(void);
+#else
+static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
index a298a3854a80..feedb47d0f55 100644
--- a/init/initramfs.c
+++ b/init/initramfs.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/umh.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "do_mounts.h"
 
@@ -719,6 +720,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie)
 #endif
 	}
 
+	security_initramfs_populated();
+
 done:
 	/*
 	 * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 820e0d437452..0db5a6b32aab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5675,3 +5675,13 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+/**
+ * security_initramfs_populated() - Notify LSMs that initramfs has been loaded
+ *
+ * Tells the LSMs the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
+ */
+void security_initramfs_populated(void)
+{
+	call_void_hook(initramfs_populated);
+}
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-13  0:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-13  0:55 [PATCH v17 00/21] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 01/21] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 02/21] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 03/21] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 04/21] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 06/21] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 07/21] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 08/21] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 09/21] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 10/21] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 11/21] block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block device Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 12/21] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 13/21] dm verity: consume root hash digest and expose signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-04-25  3:56   ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-25 20:23     ` Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 14/21] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 15/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:55 ` [PATCH v17 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-04-25  3:36   ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-13  0:56 ` [PATCH v17 17/21] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-04-25  3:42   ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-25  4:20     ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-13  0:56 ` [PATCH v17 18/21] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:56 ` [PATCH v17 19/21] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-04-13  0:56 ` [PATCH v17 20/21] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-04-15 12:11   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-04-15 14:56     ` Randy Dunlap
2024-04-17 10:05       ` Bagas Sanjaya
2024-04-25  4:13   ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-25  4:36     ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-13  0:56 ` [PATCH v17 21/21] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1712969764-31039-6-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com \
    --to=wufan@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=agk@redhat.com \
    --cc=audit@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dm-devel@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=fsverity@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=snitzer@kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).