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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	mpatocka@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v19 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function
Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 13:46:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1716583609-21790-8-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1716583609-21790-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.

This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.

Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

---
v1-v8:
  + Not present

v9:
  + Introduced

v10:
  + No changes

v11:
  + Fix code style issues

v12:
  + No changes

v13:
  + No changes

v14:
  + No changes

v15:
  + No changes

v16:
  + No changes

v17:
  + No changes

v18:
  + No changes

v19:
  + No changes
---
 include/linux/security.h |  1 +
 security/inode.c         | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2caa4c9b81ff..78a763eff4eb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2089,6 +2089,7 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 					 const char *target,
 					 const struct inode_operations *iops);
 extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
 
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 9e7cde913667..f21847badb7d 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -313,6 +313,31 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
 
+static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim)
+{
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * securityfs_recursive_remove - recursively removes a file or directory
+ *
+ * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed.
+ *
+ * This function recursively removes a file or directory in securityfs that was
+ * previously created with a call to another securityfs function (like
+ * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.)
+ */
+void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry))
+		return;
+
+	simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
+	simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one);
+	simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_recursive_remove);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 static struct dentry *lsm_dentry;
 static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
-- 
2.44.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-24 20:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-24 20:46 [PATCH v19 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 11/20] block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block device Fan Wu
2024-05-31 20:48   ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-25  9:02   ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-05-31 21:07   ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-30  1:44   ` Paul Moore
2024-05-30  3:58     ` Fan Wu
2024-05-30  5:53       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30  5:49     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-05-30  1:44   ` Paul Moore
2024-05-30  5:51     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30  6:01       ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-30  6:07         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-30  1:46   ` Paul Moore
2024-05-30  3:06     ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-30  3:38       ` Fan Wu
2024-05-30 20:54       ` Paul Moore
2024-05-31  0:43         ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 15:51           ` Paul Moore
2024-05-31 17:47             ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-03  1:40               ` Paul Moore
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-05-24 20:46 ` [PATCH v19 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu

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