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From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf, arm64: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 07:30:11 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <176535181104.487333.8109866817495387423.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251204125916.441021-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

Hello:

This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>:

On Thu,  4 Dec 2025 13:59:16 +0100 you wrote:
> Analogically to the x86 commit 881a9c9cb785 ("bpf: Do not audit
> capability check in do_jit()"), change the capable() call to
> ns_capable_noaudit() in order to avoid spurious SELinux denials in audit
> log.
> 
> The commit log from that commit applies here as well:
> """
> The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being
> applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It
> doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM
> permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes
> a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which
> tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet
> dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be
> desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going
> against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially
> harder.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - bpf, arm64: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/189e5deb944a

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html



      reply	other threads:[~2025-12-10  7:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-04 12:59 [PATCH] bpf, arm64: Do not audit capability check in do_jit() Ondrej Mosnacek
2025-12-10  7:30 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf [this message]

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