From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling an lsm_ctx
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 11:33:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <186c5de2-a07c-7401-bf8e-863defaff5ba@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6af85c04-0388-026a-e4ee-08d9aad6b86a@digikod.net>
On 4/3/2023 11:06 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 03/04/2023 20:03, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/3/2023 2:47 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>
>>> On 15/03/2023 23:47, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a
>>>> LSM_ATTR value if one is available.
>>>>
>>>> Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including
>>>> the trailing attribute value.
>>>>
>>>> All are used in module specific components of LSM system calls.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++++++++
>>>> security/lsm_syscalls.c | 51
>>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>>> index 2c57fe28c4f7..f7b814a3940c 100644
>>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>>> @@ -753,6 +753,37 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct
>>>> super_block *sb)
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> +/**
>>>> + * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure
>>>> + * @ctx: an LSM context to be filled
>>>> + * @context: the new context value
>>>> + * @context_size: the size of the new context value
>>>> + * @id: LSM id
>>>> + * @flags: LSM defined flags
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Fill all of the fields in a user space lsm_ctx structure.
>>>> + * Caller is assumed to have verified that @ctx has enough space
>>>> + * for @context.
>>>> + * Returns 0 on success, -EFAULT on a copyout error.
>>>> + */
>>>> +int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx, void *context,
>>>> + size_t context_size, u64 id, u64 flags)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct lsm_ctx local;
>>>> + void __user *vc = ctx;
>>>> +
>>>> + local.id = id;
>>>> + local.flags = flags;
>>>> + local.ctx_len = context_size;
>>>> + local.len = context_size + sizeof(local);
>>>> + vc += sizeof(local);
>>>> + if (copy_to_user(ctx, &local, sizeof(local)))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>> + if (context_size > 0 && copy_to_user(vc, context, context_size))
>>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>>
>>> Can we do a single copy_to_user() call?
>>
>> It would be possible, but would require allocating memory and copying
>> the context. I don't see that as an improvement.
>>
>>> That would avoid inconsistent user space data, could speed up a bit
>>> the operation, and make the code easier to understand. To use the
>>> stack, we need to know the maximum size of context_size for all use
>>> cases, which seems reasonable and can be checked at build time (on
>>> each LSM side, and potentially with specific context type passed as
>>> enum instead of context_size) and run time (for this generic helper).
>>
>> Knowning the maximum size of attributes for all LSMs and hard coding
>> that here would make maintaining this code really painful.
>
> Hmm, I forgot about variable-length strings, but maybe a reasonable
> common maximum size (that could fit on the stack) could be found?
Putting a maximum size limit on LSM attributes just to reduce the
number of copy_to_user() calls in this helper function does not make
a whole lot of sense to me.
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> /*
>>>> * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in
>>>> linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
>>>> * can be accessed with:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-03 18:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230315224704.2672-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 1:10 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 1:10 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-03-16 12:35 ` kernel test robot
2023-03-30 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 11:24 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:22 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-03 12:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 18:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-11 0:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-03 12:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-10 23:37 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 23:38 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 11:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47 ` [PATCH v7 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling an lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 1:13 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:28 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 16:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-31 19:24 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 20:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 9:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 9:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 11:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 18:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:33 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-03-15 22:47 ` [PATCH v7 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47 ` [PATCH v7 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47 ` [PATCH v7 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 1:13 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:32 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:47 ` [PATCH v7 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
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