From: "Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" <vbabka@kernel.org>
To: Mohammed EL Kadiri <med08elkadiri@gmail.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] keys: prevent slab cache merging for key_jar
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 14:16:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <19fb9d38-fe02-4653-bbad-58806e55ca84@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260604125034.13757-1-med08elkadiri@gmail.com>
On 6/4/26 14:50, Mohammed EL Kadiri wrote:
> The key_jar slab cache holds struct key objects containing cryptographic
> keys, authentication tokens, and keyring linkage. This cache currently
> lacks merge prevention, allowing the SLUB allocator to merge it with
> other similarly-sized caches.
>
> On a default Ubuntu 6.17.0-23-generic system, key_jar has 5 aliases,
> meaning 5 unrelated object types share its slab pages. struct key is
> 224 bytes, placed in 256-byte slabs alongside biovec-16, maple_node,
> ip6_dst_cache, task_delay_info, and kmalloc-256 users.
>
> Cross-cache heap exploitation is a well-documented attack class
> (CVE-2022-29582, CVE-2022-2588, CVE-2021-22555) where slab cache
> merging enables type confusion between unrelated kernel objects. A
> use-after-free in any subsystem sharing slab pages with key_jar could
> allow an attacker to reclaim a freed slot as a struct key, or corrupt
> an existing key through a dangling pointer to a different type.
>
> Add SLAB_NO_MERGE to ensure key_jar receives dedicated slab pages,
> eliminating cross-cache attacks targeting struct key. The memory
> overhead is minimal: with 32 objects per slab page and typical key
> usage bounded by system keyring size, the cost of dedicated pages is
> negligible. There is zero performance impact on the allocation hot
> path.
>
> This follows the precedent set by skbuff_head_cache (net/core/skbuff.c)
> which uses SLAB_NO_MERGE for similar isolation requirements.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mohammed EL Kadiri <med08elkadiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
> ---
> security/keys/key.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> index 3bbdde778631..592b65cf8539 100644
> --- a/security/keys/key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
> {
> /* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
> key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
> - 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_NO_MERGE, NULL);
>
> /* add the special key types */
> list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-05 12:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-04 12:50 [PATCH] keys: prevent slab cache merging for key_jar Mohammed EL Kadiri
2026-06-05 12:16 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=19fb9d38-fe02-4653-bbad-58806e55ca84@kernel.org \
--to=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=med08elkadiri@gmail.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox