From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1792452509; b=QBGsQJjE8qYJVMoqi+sWOI2W5CueVvxmph3TRYPkveeDAESZBOTvcD8uYUyKW6VAEkbi 7HhX7qQV55cYrp6HEZXxxJTs1S1iRplPCY2HvD/VuJwOh+atUY0Hrx5Z1YAtUIfq7ETYd uDjM3lSw/aUqJmuGc/5pDCepspBES2H5w3FxumIWdvZfuaOr1Vw9YBK7GQWBQbdIDeyqq zcIg8V+0SVf/xPFfg1lb5rX7sYp+pGx0U9MKJZKLY8zGbDnlXzAbN0qPfSRuhgNAQnaHr wyTpPt4C46sN1DpYorC7TGFsq3n0N8c21ffnS8kFmzBL1YoWDliN/KadwM3Bq+mfTTQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1792452509; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:User-Agent: Subject:To:Cc:References:Content-Language:From:In-Reply-To: Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=ML8QuNr/SitRoSc3ITEYHmuyYUgVewzWtNVAZkiyDrE=; b=QO85JXRPoKytZ8BS2rAdcDs1znthD6o9aP+sgVSp1JHbUtcIhTV2CFdIHxVXL9xXSjnj hRB2ftEhKs4cyehBc6pk4mPfnI36uAML+5VyTR15W7/o0glvYaGVUc6SdA/d47pLMbyc9 J03FbYjl+vcUL2pPPcyba2MGjCmaSAE0fK/kjPz0OL6VcCN3QrAAKCO/HVYenRHi37fYH +DLejaMr9f25Dn3/Cd3OVDKVikU3O3u/s/sS2/YvQO6PRA7HtlhMg5PggfBtM6SqXAtOK dv9pXTk3IWgfJqQNqfCt0UdG13u2mTr1Zi4UibFnGHOiB/eL3GXzQtw6IS2bL6aEQeA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Tqn4kl1P; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5CB50606A31E; Mon, 19 Oct 2026 23:28:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Tqn4kl1P Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AA3F71F000C5; Mon, 19 Oct 2026 23:28:28 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1792452508; bh=ML8QuNr/SitRoSc3ITEYHmuyYUgVewzWtNVAZkiyDrE=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To; b=Tqn4kl1PBPlF2kJixJd/7mcxxNuVLf+rAAEUu4w/kptLkmEe42mooG5/d2QlJiedF AraewhApdjMu8UNc+h2EcoVwZrBaPMASILorZSqAGTMMzlvw/JxFkwF98K8ICs36A6 HD+/6JXVP6rp3sPLcTU+hTTg+0dIFjf0czrL097yKqHljEnxEErWHRyEImtiz/s1a2 M71ODIREV7LtTdztLHznrO0xvkVBPxz5u0fAX/7kqRUUf0zUvsu43y8w6vz57gQN4f jKT+jrq9unme/Y815KwMAgGcVGx4br4fDV3TnOpDTGpI+npQAoqybcpfUmH9SvMUFO 6T+1Z2ybUEa1w== Message-ID: <1c39ea06-4b5c-49c0-a508-06955c549556@kernel.org> Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 16:28:28 -0700 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/4] selftests/ipe: test the IPE policy keyring To: manuelh@nvidia.com, David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Christian Brauner , Andrew Halaney , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20261019-b4-ipe-keyring-rfc-v1-0-156f0b93e843@nvidia.com> <20261019-b4-ipe-keyring-rfc-v1-4-156f0b93e843@nvidia.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Fan Wu In-Reply-To: <20261019-b4-ipe-keyring-rfc-v1-4-156f0b93e843@nvidia.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 10/19/2026 2:40 PM, Manuel Huber via B4 Relay wrote: > From: Manuel Huber > > Add an IPE kselftest that validates policy keyring operations for > both ipe.keyring_unsealed values 0 and 1. > > For the default ipe.keyring_unsealed=0, verify that a) the special key > ID resolves, b) certificate enrollment is rejected, and c) the keyring > is not used for policy verification. > For ipe.keyring_unsealed=1, verify that we can a) provision multiple > certificates, b) restrict the keyring, then reject unenrolled and > corrupted signatures, c) authenticate policy loads and updates with > different enrolled certificates. > > Since IPE is built in, keyring restriction is irreversible, which is > why we can only exercise the initially sealed and unsealed scenarios > via separate boots. To get full coverage, CI thus needs to spin up > separate environments with respective parameter values. > > Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber > --- IPE doesn't use kselftest. Our tests live in the IPE CI [1], which already has keyring tests for policy signatures [2] and an initrd unit that provisions and seals the .fs-verity keyring [3]. Please add the .ipe cases there instead. [1] https://github.com/Integrity-Policy-Enforcement/ci [2] https://github.com/Integrity-Policy-Enforcement/ci/blob/main/suite/cases/policy_signature.py [3] https://github.com/Integrity-Policy-Enforcement/ci/blob/main/image/initrd/anchor-fsverity.service Fan