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From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob.
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 10:37:16 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170313153716.GA29279@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1489293309-41929-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp):
> We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
> in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
> TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
> security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
> task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
> example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
> a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
> security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
> wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
> security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
> not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
> which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. PTAGS LSM module
> and CaitSith LSM module which are currently under proposal for inclusion
> also want to use it. Therefore, it will be time to revive
> security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field.
> 
> We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
> armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
> like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
> lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
> hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
> implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
> become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
> "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
> this patch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

nit below,

> Cc: Jos? Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
> ---
>  include/linux/init_task.h | 7 +++++++
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 9 ++++++++-
>  include/linux/sched.h     | 4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h  | 7 +++++++
>  kernel/fork.c             | 7 ++++++-
>  security/security.c       | 6 ++++++
>  6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
> index 91d9049..926f2f5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/init_task.h
> +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
> @@ -210,6 +210,12 @@
>  # define INIT_TASK_TI(tsk)
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY .security = NULL,
> +#else
> +#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   *  INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at
>   * your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)
> @@ -288,6 +294,7 @@
>  	INIT_VTIME(tsk)							\
>  	INIT_NUMA_BALANCING(tsk)					\
>  	INIT_KASAN(tsk)							\
> +	INIT_TASK_SECURITY						\
>  }
>  
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 1aa6333..a4193c3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -533,8 +533,13 @@
>   *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
>   *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @task_alloc:
> + *      @task task being allocated.

Note that here you have spaces not tabs

> + *      @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
> + *      Handle allocation of task-related resources.
> + *      Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
>   * @task_free:
> - *	@task task being freed
> + *	@task task about to be freed.
>   *	Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
>   *	from interrupt context.)
>   * @cred_alloc_blank:
> @@ -1482,6 +1487,7 @@
>  	int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
>  
>  	int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
> +	int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
>  	void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
>  	int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
>  	void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred);
> @@ -1748,6 +1754,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct list_head file_receive;
>  	struct list_head file_open;
>  	struct list_head task_create;
> +	struct list_head task_alloc;
>  	struct list_head task_free;
>  	struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
>  	struct list_head cred_free;
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index d67eee8..71b8df3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -1038,6 +1038,10 @@ struct task_struct {
>  	/* A live task holds one reference: */
>  	atomic_t			stack_refcount;
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +	/* Used by LSM modules for access restriction: */
> +	void				*security;
> +#endif
>  	/* CPU-specific state of this task: */
>  	struct thread_struct		thread;
>  
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 97df7ba..af675b5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
>  int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
>  int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
> +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
>  void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
>  int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
> @@ -861,6 +862,12 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
> +				      unsigned long clone_flags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>  { }
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 6c463c80..3d32513 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1679,9 +1679,12 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_perf;
>  	/* copy all the process information */
>  	shm_init_task(p);
> -	retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p);
> +	retval = security_task_alloc(p, clone_flags);
>  	if (retval)
>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
> +	retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p);
> +	if (retval)
> +		goto bad_fork_cleanup_security;
>  	retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p);
>  	if (retval)
>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
> @@ -1903,6 +1906,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>  	exit_files(p); /* blocking */
>  bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
>  	exit_sem(p);
> +bad_fork_cleanup_security:
> +	security_task_free(p);
>  bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
>  	audit_free(p);
>  bad_fork_cleanup_perf:
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d6d18a3..5b6cdd0 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -930,6 +930,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
>  }
>  
> +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
> +}
> +
>  void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
>  	call_void_hook(task_free, task);
> @@ -1770,6 +1775,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.file_receive =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_receive),
>  	.file_open =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_open),
>  	.task_create =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_create),
> +	.task_alloc =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_alloc),
>  	.task_free =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_free),
>  	.cred_alloc_blank =
>  		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_alloc_blank),
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-13 15:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-12  4:35 [PATCH] LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-13  6:32 ` [PATCH] apparmor: move task specific domain change info out of cred John Johansen
2017-03-13 16:47   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-03-13 17:05     ` John Johansen
2017-03-13 17:16       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-13 17:50         ` John Johansen
2017-03-13 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-03-16 11:09   ` [PATCH] LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-13 16:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-17 10:37 ` Tetsuo Handa
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-03-24 11:46 Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-24 12:11 ` José Bollo
2017-03-24 12:27   ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-26  1:49 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-03-26 21:09   ` James Morris
2017-03-28  0:21 ` James Morris
2017-03-28 11:02   ` Tetsuo Handa

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