From: ebiggers3@gmail.com (Eric Biggers)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 22:47:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170604054746.GC12095@zzz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a507374a-e1b9-de56-5d50-825c283111ca@nmatt.com>
On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 01:24:13AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> On 06/03/2017 02:33 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> > On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> >
> > > +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > +{
> > > + struct file *file = bprm->file;
> > > + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> > > + struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
> >
> > Bloody wonderful. Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
> > somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
> >
>
> Good catch. How does this look:
>
> spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> spin_lock(&file_inode->i_lock);
> if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid))
> reason1 = "directory not owned by user";
> else if (inode->i_mode & 0002)
> reason1 = "file in world-writable directory";
> else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid))
> reason1 = "file in group-writable directory";
> else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002)
> reason1 = "file is world-writable";
> spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> spin_unlock(&file_inode->i_lock);
>
> and likewise for other places in the code?
No, it needs to take a reference on the parent dentry before using it, using
dget_parent(), I think, and then dropping it later with dput(). Taking i_lock
isn't needed.
Eric
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-04 5:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-03 5:53 [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Matt Brown
2017-06-03 6:33 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04 5:24 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04 5:47 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-06-04 12:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-04 6:51 ` Al Viro
2017-06-03 10:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-03 22:30 ` Matt Brown
2017-06-05 15:30 ` Alan Cox
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