From: vgoyal@redhat.com (Vivek Goyal)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 16:36:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170623203643.GC24779@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170623201723.GA22857@mail.hallyn.com>
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 03:17:23PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Vivek Goyal (vgoyal at redhat.com):
> > On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 02:59:46PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > This series of patches primary goal is to enable file capabilities
> > > in user namespaces without affecting the file capabilities that are
> > > effective on the host. This is to prevent that any unprivileged user
> > > on the host maps his own uid to root in a private namespace, writes
> > > the xattr, and executes the file with privilege on the host.
> > >
> > > We achieve this goal by writing extended attributes with a different
> > > name when a user namespace is used. If for example the root user
> > > in a user namespace writes the security.capability xattr, the name
> > > of the xattr that is actually written is encoded as
> > > security.capability at uid=1000 for root mapped to uid 1000 on the host.
> > > When listing the xattrs on the host, the existing security.capability
> > > as well as the security.capability at uid=1000 will be shown. Inside the
> > > namespace only 'security.capability', with the value of
> > > security.capability at uid=1000, is visible.
> >
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > Got a question. If child usernamespace sets a
> > security.capability at uid=1000, can any of the parent namespace remove it?
> >
> > IOW, I set capability from usernamespace and tried to remove it from
> > host and that failed. Is that expected.
> >
> > # Inside usernamespce
> > $setcap cat_net_raw+ep foo.txt
> >
> > # outside user namespace
> > $listxattr foo.txt
> > xattr: security.capability at uid=1000
> > xattr: security.selinux
> >
> > # outside user namespace
> > setfattr -x security.capability at uid foo.txt
> > setfattr: foo.txt: Invalid argument
> >
> > Doing a strace shows removexattr() failed. May this will need fixing?
> >
> > removexattr("testfile.txt", "security.capability at uid") = -1 EINVAL
> > (Invalid argument)
>
> That's not the right xattr, though, does
>
> setfattr -x security.capability at uid=1000 foo.txt
>
> work?
Yep, that works (as root on host). My bad.
>
> If you are in fact uid=1000 then that should work.
Tried setfattr -x as uid 1000 in init_user_ns and that seems to have
issues.
$ ll testfile.txt
-rw-r--r--. 1 vivek vivek 0 Jun 23 15:44 testfile.txt
$listxattr testfile.txt
xattr: security.capability at uid=1000
xattr: security.selinux
$id
uid=1000(vivek) gid=1000(vivek) groups=1000(vivek)
context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
$setfattr -x security.capability at uid=1000 testfile.txt
setfattr: testfile.txt: Operation not permitted
I had to launch a user namespace with 1000 mapped to 0 inside user
namespace and then "setfattr -x security.capability testfile.txt" worked.
> If you are uid 1001,
> and 1000 was delegated to you, then you'll need to create a transient
> userns with uid 1000 mapped into it in order to delete it (so that you
> have privilege over the uid).
Will give this a try.
Vivek
>
> If that doesn't work, then it's a bug.
>
> -serge
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-23 20:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-22 18:59 [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 1/3] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces Stefan Berger
2017-06-24 21:02 ` [PATCH] xattr: fix kstrdup.cocci warnings kbuild test robot
2017-06-24 21:02 ` [PATCH 1/3] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces kbuild test robot
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 2/3] Enable capabilities of files from shared filesystem Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 3/3] Enable security.selinux in user namespaces Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 20:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-23 23:41 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 19:59 ` [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 20:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 20:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 21:03 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 21:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 22:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 23:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 23:29 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-22 23:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 23:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 0:13 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-23 1:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-23 18:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 7:01 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-23 16:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 16:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 16:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 16:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 17:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-23 18:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:07 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-23 17:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:38 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 18:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 18:08 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 18:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 23:09 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 23:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-28 5:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-28 7:18 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-28 14:04 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-28 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-06-23 20:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:36 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2017-06-23 20:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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