From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 15:51:18 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170623205118.GA23674@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170623203643.GC24779@redhat.com>
Quoting Vivek Goyal (vgoyal at redhat.com):
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 03:17:23PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Vivek Goyal (vgoyal at redhat.com):
> > > On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 02:59:46PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > This series of patches primary goal is to enable file capabilities
> > > > in user namespaces without affecting the file capabilities that are
> > > > effective on the host. This is to prevent that any unprivileged user
> > > > on the host maps his own uid to root in a private namespace, writes
> > > > the xattr, and executes the file with privilege on the host.
> > > >
> > > > We achieve this goal by writing extended attributes with a different
> > > > name when a user namespace is used. If for example the root user
> > > > in a user namespace writes the security.capability xattr, the name
> > > > of the xattr that is actually written is encoded as
> > > > security.capability at uid=1000 for root mapped to uid 1000 on the host.
> > > > When listing the xattrs on the host, the existing security.capability
> > > > as well as the security.capability at uid=1000 will be shown. Inside the
> > > > namespace only 'security.capability', with the value of
> > > > security.capability at uid=1000, is visible.
> > >
> > > Hi Stefan,
> > >
> > > Got a question. If child usernamespace sets a
> > > security.capability at uid=1000, can any of the parent namespace remove it?
> > >
> > > IOW, I set capability from usernamespace and tried to remove it from
> > > host and that failed. Is that expected.
> > >
> > > # Inside usernamespce
> > > $setcap cat_net_raw+ep foo.txt
> > >
> > > # outside user namespace
> > > $listxattr foo.txt
> > > xattr: security.capability at uid=1000
> > > xattr: security.selinux
> > >
> > > # outside user namespace
> > > setfattr -x security.capability at uid foo.txt
> > > setfattr: foo.txt: Invalid argument
> > >
> > > Doing a strace shows removexattr() failed. May this will need fixing?
> > >
> > > removexattr("testfile.txt", "security.capability at uid") = -1 EINVAL
> > > (Invalid argument)
> >
> > That's not the right xattr, though, does
> >
> > setfattr -x security.capability at uid=1000 foo.txt
> >
> > work?
>
> Yep, that works (as root on host). My bad.
>
> >
> > If you are in fact uid=1000 then that should work.
>
> Tried setfattr -x as uid 1000 in init_user_ns and that seems to have
> issues.
D'oh, yes, I was thinking wrongly. You need *privilege* over the uid, meaning
CAP_SETFACL against your user_ns and uid 1000 mapped into the user_ns. So yeah
just uid 1000 won't suffice.
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-23 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-22 18:59 [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 1/3] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces Stefan Berger
2017-06-24 21:02 ` [PATCH] xattr: fix kstrdup.cocci warnings kbuild test robot
2017-06-24 21:02 ` [PATCH 1/3] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces kbuild test robot
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 2/3] Enable capabilities of files from shared filesystem Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 18:59 ` [PATCH 3/3] Enable security.selinux in user namespaces Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 20:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-23 23:41 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 19:59 ` [PATCH 0/3] Enable namespaced file capabilities Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 20:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 20:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 21:03 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-22 21:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 22:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-22 23:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 23:29 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-22 23:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-22 23:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 0:13 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-23 1:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-23 18:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 7:01 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-23 16:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 16:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 16:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 16:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 17:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-23 18:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:07 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-23 17:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 17:38 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 18:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 18:08 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 18:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-23 23:09 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-23 23:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-28 5:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-28 7:18 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-28 14:04 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-28 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:09 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-06-23 20:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-23 20:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-06-23 20:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
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