[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[Eric Biggers]

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key.  If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key.  But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload.  Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.

Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...

Reproducer:
    keyctl new_session
    keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
    keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')

It causes a crash like the following:
     BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
     IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
     PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
     Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
     CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
     Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
     task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
     RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
     RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
     RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
     RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
     R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     FS:  00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
     CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
     Call Trace:
      keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
      SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
     RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
     RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
     RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
     R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
     RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92

Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ab0b337c84b4..6a82090c7fc1 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -766,6 +766,11 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
 	/* see if we can read it directly */
 	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
 	if (ret == 0)
-- 
2.14.1.690.gbb1197296e-goog

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[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[David Howells]

Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:

> +	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
> +		ret = -ENOKEY;
> +		goto error2;
> +	}

It might be better to do this check in key_validate().  Also, it should
perhaps take the error from key->reject_error.

David
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[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[Eric Biggers]

On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 05:09:02PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > +	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
> > +		ret = -ENOKEY;
> > +		goto error2;
> > +	}
> 
> It might be better to do this check in key_validate().  Also, it should
> perhaps take the error from key->reject_error.
> 
> David

Putting the check in key_validate() would make lookups with KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
stop returning negative keys, which would break keyctl_describe(),
keyctl_chown(), keyctl_setperm(), keyctl_set_timeout(), keyctl_get_security() on
negative keys.  I presume those are supposed to work?

Another solution would be to remove the special case from lookup_user_key()
where it can return a negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key if
KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL is not specified and the 'perm' mask is 0.  The only callers
it would affect are the case in question here which is clearly a bug, and the
root-only exceptions for keyctl_invalidate() and keyctl_clear().  And I suspect
the latter two are unintentional as well.  (Is root *supposed* to be able to
invalidate a negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key, or clear a
revoked/invalidated/expired keyring?)

Eric
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[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[David Howells]

Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:

> Putting the check in key_validate() would make lookups with
> KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL stop returning negative keys, which would break
> keyctl_describe(), keyctl_chown(), keyctl_setperm(), keyctl_set_timeout(),
> keyctl_get_security() on negative keys.  I presume those are supposed to
> work?

Lookups with KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL should never return a negative key by
definition.  A negative key is instantiated with an error code, so is no longer
under construction.

key_get_instantiation_authkey() must fail if the key has been constructed - but
I guess there's a potential race in keyctl_describe_key(), keyctl_set_timeout()
and keyctl_get_security() between getting the auth token and calling
lookup_user_key() with perm of 0 in which the key could be instantiated,
revoked, or instantiated elsewhere, or simply expire.  This would allow the
instantiating process a longer access window - but they do/did have a valid
token...

It should still be possible to describe, chown, setperm and get the security on
negative keys by the normal access mechanism.  Changing the timeout should
probably be denied.

> Another solution would be to remove the special case from lookup_user_key()
> where it can return a negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key if
> KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL is not specified and the 'perm' mask is 0.

There are a number of circumstances in which it lookup_user_key() is called
with perm==0, and in each case, the caller is responsible for handling the
security:

 (1) keyctl_invalidate_key() will do so if the caller doesn't have permission,
     but CAP_SYS_ADMIN is set and the key is marked KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL.

 (2) keyctl_keyring_clear() will do so if the caller doesn't have permission,
     but CAP_SYS_ADMIN is set and the key is marked KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR.

 (3) keyctl_keyring_unlink() will do so on the key-to-be-removed since only the
     keyring needs a perm check.

 (4) keyctl_read_key() always does so and then does the READ perm check and the
     possessor-can-SEARCH can search check itself.

 (5) keyctl_describe_key(), keyctl_set_timeout() and keyctl_get_security() will
     do so if the caller doesn't have permission, but does have a valid
     authorisation token.  The latter requires that the key be under
     construction.

Functions that use KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL include:

 keyctl_describe_key()
 keyctl_chown_key()
 keyctl_setperm_key()
 keyctl_set_timeout()
 keyctl_get_security()

all of which might need to be called from the upcall program.  None of these
should look at the payload.

> The only callers it would affect are the case in question here which is
> clearly a bug,

keyctl_read_key() is definitely buggy.  Actually, rather than manually testing
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE there, it should probably use key_validate().

> and the root-only exceptions for keyctl_invalidate() and
> keyctl_clear().  And I suspect the latter two are unintentional as well.

I'm not sure what you think is unintentional.

> (Is root *supposed* to be able to invalidate a
> negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key, or clear a
> revoked/invalidated/expired keyring?)

You should be able to invalidate or unlink negative, revoked or expired keys if
you have permission to do so.  If you're using keyrings to cache stuff, you
need to be able to invalidate negative results as well as positive ones.

Invalidation of an invalidated key doesn't really make sense, but it shouldn't
hurt.  I can't immediately automatically remove all links to the invalidated
key, but have to leave it to the garbage collector to effect.

As for clearing of revoked/invalidated/expired keyrings, I'm not sure whether
it makes sense to allow it - however, whilst keyrings are cleared upon
revocation (since we have a definite point to do that with the key sem
writelocked), they aren't automatically cleared upon expiry or invalidation, so
it might make sense to permit it still.

David
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[PATCH] KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key

[Eric Biggers]

On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 02:29:56PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > Putting the check in key_validate() would make lookups with
> > KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL stop returning negative keys, which would break
> > keyctl_describe(), keyctl_chown(), keyctl_setperm(), keyctl_set_timeout(),
> > keyctl_get_security() on negative keys.  I presume those are supposed to
> > work?
> 
> Lookups with KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL should never return a negative key by
> definition.  A negative key is instantiated with an error code, so is no longer
> under construction.

Well, that's not what KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL actually does.  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
allows the returned key to be uninstantiated, negatively instantiated, *or*
positively instantiated; and the callers seem to rely on that.  Perhaps a better
name might have been KEY_LOOKUP_ALLOW_PARTIAL or KEY_LOOKUP_ALLOW_NONPOSITIVE.

On the other hand, without KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, the returned key is required to
be positively instantiated.  However, there is a special case.  Namely, if no
permissions are requested, the returned key is allowed to be negative (as well
as revoked, invalidated, or expired --- though those can happen at any time
anyway until you do down_read(&key->sem)).  I'm questioning whether we need that
special case.

> 
> key_get_instantiation_authkey() must fail if the key has been constructed - but
> I guess there's a potential race in keyctl_describe_key(), keyctl_set_timeout()
> and keyctl_get_security() between getting the auth token and calling
> lookup_user_key() with perm of 0 in which the key could be instantiated,
> revoked, or instantiated elsewhere, or simply expire.  This would allow the
> instantiating process a longer access window - but they do/did have a valid
> token...

Yes, by the time key_get_instantiation_authkey() returns, the key may have
already been instantiated.  But I'm not too concerned about that, since the
caller must still have had a non-revoked authorization key shortly before.

> 
> It should still be possible to describe, chown, setperm and get the security on
> negative keys by the normal access mechanism.  Changing the timeout should
> probably be denied.
> 
> > Another solution would be to remove the special case from lookup_user_key()
> > where it can return a negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key if
> > KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL is not specified and the 'perm' mask is 0.
> 
> There are a number of circumstances in which it lookup_user_key() is called
> with perm==0, and in each case, the caller is responsible for handling the
> security:
> 
>  (1) keyctl_invalidate_key() will do so if the caller doesn't have permission,
>      but CAP_SYS_ADMIN is set and the key is marked KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL.
> 
>  (2) keyctl_keyring_clear() will do so if the caller doesn't have permission,
>      but CAP_SYS_ADMIN is set and the key is marked KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR.
> 
>  (3) keyctl_keyring_unlink() will do so on the key-to-be-removed since only the
>      keyring needs a perm check.
> 
>  (4) keyctl_read_key() always does so and then does the READ perm check and the
>      possessor-can-SEARCH can search check itself.
> 
>  (5) keyctl_describe_key(), keyctl_set_timeout() and keyctl_get_security() will
>      do so if the caller doesn't have permission, but does have a valid
>      authorisation token.  The latter requires that the key be under
>      construction.

It's not about the permission checks.  It's about whether a negative key is
allowed to be returned or not.  And I think overloading 'perm' for that is not
really appropriate, and the cause of the bug in keyctl_read_key().  See the
code, it ignores the return value of wait_for_key_construction() if 'perm' is 0:

        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
                ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
                switch (ret) {
                case -ERESTARTSYS:
                        goto invalid_key;
                default:
                        if (perm)
                                goto invalid_key;
                case 0:
                        break;
                }
	}

> 
> Functions that use KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL include:
> 
>  keyctl_describe_key()
>  keyctl_chown_key()
>  keyctl_setperm_key()
>  keyctl_set_timeout()
>  keyctl_get_security()
> 
> all of which might need to be called from the upcall program.  None of these
> should look at the payload.
> 
> > The only callers it would affect are the case in question here which is
> > clearly a bug,
> 
> keyctl_read_key() is definitely buggy.  Actually, rather than manually testing
> KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE there, it should probably use key_validate().

It already does use key_validate().  But key_validate() is also used in
lookup_user_key(), where it is expected to accept a negative key.

The real problem seems to be that the permissions mask rather than the flags
argument is used to tell lookup_user_key() whether it can return a negative key.

> 
> > and the root-only exceptions for keyctl_invalidate() and
> > keyctl_clear().  And I suspect the latter two are unintentional as well.
> 
> I'm not sure what you think is unintentional.
> 

That root is allowed to invalidate or clear a
negative/invalidated/revoked/expired key or keyring but regular users cannot.

Again, the problem seems to be that the 'perm' argument is used for more than
just the permission check.  I think the 'lflags' argument should indicate what
state the key is allowed to be in, not 'perm'.

> > (Is root *supposed* to be able to invalidate a
> > negative/revoked/invalidated/expired key, or clear a
> > revoked/invalidated/expired keyring?)
> 
> You should be able to invalidate or unlink negative, revoked or expired keys if
> you have permission to do so.  If you're using keyrings to cache stuff, you
> need to be able to invalidate negative results as well as positive ones.
> 
> Invalidation of an invalidated key doesn't really make sense, but it shouldn't
> hurt.  I can't immediately automatically remove all links to the invalidated
> key, but have to leave it to the garbage collector to effect.
> 
> As for clearing of revoked/invalidated/expired keyrings, I'm not sure whether
> it makes sense to allow it - however, whilst keyrings are cleared upon
> revocation (since we have a definite point to do that with the key sem
> writelocked), they aren't automatically cleared upon expiry or invalidation, so
> it might make sense to permit it still.
> 

Eric
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