From: ebiggers3@gmail.com (Eric Biggers)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/7] KEYS: instantiation and atomicity fixes
Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2017 12:50:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170927195047.122358-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The first two patches in this series fix bugs related to instantiating
keys which allowed unprivileged users to cause a kernel oops.
Specifically, the first patch removes the ability for add_key() to
update an uninstantiated key, as this was heavily broken; and the second
patch fixes a race condition related to add_key() updating a negative
key into a positive one.
The remaining patches fix some other, more theoretical atomicity issues
with accessing key->flags and key->expiry, then eliminate
KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, which becomes unnecessary after the second patch.
Eric Biggers (7):
KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key
KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key
KEYS: load key flags atomically in key_is_instantiated()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in
keyring_search_iterator()
KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()
KEYS: remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE
include/linux/key.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 +-
security/keys/gc.c | 4 +---
security/keys/key.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 ++++-
security/keys/keyring.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
security/keys/permission.c | 7 ++++---
security/keys/proc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
security/keys/request_key.c | 11 +++++++----
security/keys/trusted.c | 2 +-
security/keys/user_defined.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
--
2.14.2.822.g60be5d43e6-goog
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next reply other threads:[~2017-09-27 19:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-27 19:50 Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] KEYS: load key flags atomically in key_is_instantiated() Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate() Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator() Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show() Eric Biggers
2017-09-27 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] KEYS: remove KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE Eric Biggers
2017-10-04 14:34 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key David Howells
2017-10-04 16:33 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] KEYS: fix race between updating and finding negative key David Howells
2017-10-12 15:27 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key David Howells
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