* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook @ 2017-10-16 20:37 Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett ` (2 more replies) 0 siblings, 3 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 20:37 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/security.c | 7 +++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index ce02f76a6188..48a929fd47e6 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -556,6 +556,10 @@ * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * Transfer data from original creds to new creds + * @cred_getsecid: + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c + * @p contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). * @new points to the credentials to be modified. @@ -1510,6 +1514,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); + void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); @@ -1783,6 +1788,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head cred_free; struct list_head cred_prepare; struct list_head cred_transfer; + struct list_head cred_getsecid; struct list_head kernel_act_as; struct list_head kernel_create_files_as; struct list_head kernel_read_file; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 458e24bea2d4..8d969958c25e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 55b5997e4b72..0f5784880c94 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1009,6 +1009,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); } +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); + int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 33fd061305c4..e0828e9130c7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3829,6 +3829,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) *tsec = *old_tsec; } +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + rcu_read_lock(); + *secid = cred_sid(c); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled @@ -6332,6 +6339,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 6a71fc7831ab..5af7b7e709bc 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -391,6 +391,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t return skp; } +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_cred(const struct cred *c) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + skp = smk_of_task(c->security); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return skp; +} + /* * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob. */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 463af86812c7..f1710cf76f7f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2080,6 +2080,19 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) /* cbs copy rule list */ } +/** + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure + * @c: the object creds + * @secid: where to put the result + * + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. + */ +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_cred(c); + *secid = skp->smk_secid; +} + /** * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. @@ -4684,6 +4697,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), -- 2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy 2017-10-16 20:37 [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi 2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-16 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Casey Schaufler 2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore 2 siblings, 2 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 20:37 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 +++++++-- 8 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index e76432b9954d..5dc9eed035fb 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description: [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] - base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 6fc888ca468e..ad30094a58b4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d52b487ad259..0703a96072b5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(FILE_CHECK) \ hook(MMAP_CHECK) \ hook(BPRM_CHECK) \ + hook(CREDS_CHECK) \ hook(POST_SETATTR) \ hook(MODULE_CHECK) \ hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \ @@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ enum ima_hooks { }; /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -212,8 +213,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, - int flags, int *pcr); +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_update_policy(void); void ima_update_policy_flag(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c2edba8de35e..ff33b7e65a07 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, /** * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure + * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -165,20 +166,21 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE; flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr); + return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, func, mask, flags, pcr); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 809ba70fbbbf..137b8d1708c6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL); + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), func, mask, + IMA_APPRAISE, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, @@ -86,6 +87,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return iint->ima_mmap_status; case BPRM_CHECK: return iint->ima_bprm_status; + case CREDS_CHECK: + return iint->ima_creds_status; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: return iint->ima_file_status; @@ -106,6 +109,8 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, case BPRM_CHECK: iint->ima_bprm_status = status; break; + case CREDS_CHECK: + iint->ima_creds_status = status; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: iint->ima_file_status = status; @@ -127,6 +132,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, case BPRM_CHECK: iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; + case CREDS_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb7984437..f41aa427792b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -155,8 +155,9 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); } -static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened) +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, + char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func, int opened) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr); + action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) @@ -282,8 +283,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) - return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, - MMAP_CHECK, 0); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); return 0; } @@ -302,8 +303,14 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) */ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, - BPRM_CHECK, 0); + int ret; + + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0); } /** @@ -318,7 +325,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) { - return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); } @@ -413,7 +420,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), buf, size, MAY_READ, + func, 0); } static int __init init_ima(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask) + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func, + int mask) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int i; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, @@ -339,6 +338,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; case BPRM_CHECK: return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; + case CREDS_CHECK: + return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE; case FILE_CHECK: case POST_SETATTR: return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; @@ -351,6 +352,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) /** * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made + * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is + * being made * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -362,8 +365,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, - int flags, int *pcr) +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); @@ -374,7 +377,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask)) + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, func, mask)) continue; action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; @@ -691,6 +694,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = CREDS_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 0a721c110e92..8d532c3557b5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -48,10 +48,14 @@ #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 #define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000 #define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00004000 +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00008000 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE) #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED) enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -109,6 +113,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4; enum integrity_status evm_status:4; struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; -- 2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi 2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar 1 sibling, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Mikhail Kurinnoi @ 2017-10-16 21:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module ? Mon, 16 Oct 2017 13:37:09 -0700 Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> ?????: > The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the > credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the > child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target > and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In > ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and > the credentials that will be committed when the new process is > started. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> > Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org > Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> > Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- > security/integrity/iint.c | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 ++++--- > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++--- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++++++++- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 9 +++++++-- > 8 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index > e76432b9954d..5dc9eed035fb 100644 --- > a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ > b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description: > [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] > option: [[appraise_type=]] > [permit_directio] > - base: func:= > [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] > + base: func:= > [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] > [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] > mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] > [[^]MAY_APPEND] diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c > b/security/integrity/iint.c index 6fc888ca468e..ad30094a58b4 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c > @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache > *iint) iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > + iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; > iint->measured_pcrs = 0; > kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d52b487ad259..0703a96072b5 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 > *digest) hook(FILE_CHECK) \ > hook(MMAP_CHECK) \ > hook(BPRM_CHECK) \ > + hook(CREDS_CHECK) \ > hook(POST_SETATTR) \ > hook(MODULE_CHECK) \ > hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \ > @@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ enum ima_hooks { > }; > > /* LIM API function definitions */ > -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, > +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, int > mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); > int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks > func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > @@ -212,8 +213,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct > ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path > *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); > /* IMA policy related functions */ > -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int > mask, > - int flags, int *pcr); > +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, > + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int > *pcr); void ima_init_policy(void); > void ima_update_policy(void); > void ima_update_policy_flag(void); > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c2edba8de35e..ff33b7e65a07 > 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const > unsigned char *filename, /** > * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. > * @inode: pointer to inode to measure > + * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate > * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, > MAY_EXEC, > * MAY_APPEND) > * @func: caller identifier > @@ -165,20 +166,21 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const > unsigned char *filename, > * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: > * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= > * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. > - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK > + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | > MODULE_CHECK > * mask: contains the permission mask > * fsmagic: hex value > * > * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. > * > */ > -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks > func, int *pcr) +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct > cred *cred, int mask, > + enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) > { > int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE; > > flags &= ima_policy_flag; > > - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr); > + return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, func, mask, flags, pcr); > } > > /* > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index > 809ba70fbbbf..137b8d1708c6 100644 --- > a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ int > ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) > if (!ima_appraise) return 0; > > - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, > NULL); > + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), func, mask, > + IMA_APPRAISE, NULL); > } > > static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, > @@ -86,6 +87,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct > integrity_iint_cache *iint, return iint->ima_mmap_status; > case BPRM_CHECK: > return iint->ima_bprm_status; > + case CREDS_CHECK: > + return iint->ima_creds_status; > case FILE_CHECK: > case POST_SETATTR: > return iint->ima_file_status; > @@ -106,6 +109,8 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct > integrity_iint_cache *iint, case BPRM_CHECK: > iint->ima_bprm_status = status; > break; > + case CREDS_CHECK: > + iint->ima_creds_status = status; > case FILE_CHECK: > case POST_SETATTR: > iint->ima_file_status = status; > @@ -127,6 +132,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct > integrity_iint_cache *iint, case BPRM_CHECK: > iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); > break; > + case CREDS_CHECK: > + iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); > + break; > case FILE_CHECK: > case POST_SETATTR: > iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb7984437..f41aa427792b > 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -155,8 +155,9 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) > ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); > } > > -static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t > size, > - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int > opened) +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const > struct cred *cred, > + char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, > + enum ima_hooks func, int opened) > { > struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; > @@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, > char *buf, loff_t size, > * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. > * Included is the appraise submask. > */ > - action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr); > + action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, mask, func, &pcr); > violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == > MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); > if (!action && !violation_check) > @@ -282,8 +283,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, > char *buf, loff_t size, int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned > long prot) { > if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) > - return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, > - MMAP_CHECK, 0); > + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), > NULL, 0, > + MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); > return 0; > } > > @@ -302,8 +303,14 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned > long prot) */ > int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > - return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, > - BPRM_CHECK, 0); > + int ret; > + > + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), NULL, > 0, > + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, NULL, 0, > + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0); > } > > /** > @@ -318,7 +325,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > */ > int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) > { > - return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, > + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), NULL, 0, > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | > MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); > } > @@ -413,7 +420,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void > *buf, loff_t size, } > > func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > - return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, > 0); > + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), buf, size, > MAY_READ, > + func, 0); > } > > static int __init init_ima(void) > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index > 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644 --- > a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static > void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) > * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. > */ > static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct > inode *inode, > - enum ima_hooks func, int mask) > + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks > func, > + int mask) > { > - struct task_struct *tsk = current; > - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > int i; > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && > @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry > *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: > case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: > case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: > - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid); > rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, > rule->lsm[i].type, > Audit_equal, > @@ -339,6 +338,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry > *rule, enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; > case BPRM_CHECK: > return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; > + case CREDS_CHECK: > + return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE; > case FILE_CHECK: > case POST_SETATTR: > return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; > @@ -351,6 +352,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry > *rule, enum ima_hooks func) /** > * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions > * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is > being made > + * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy > decision is > + * being made > * @func: IMA hook identifier > * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | > MAY_EXEC) > * @pcr: set the pcr to extend > @@ -362,8 +365,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry > *rule, enum ima_hooks func) > * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more > numerous > * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. > */ > -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int > mask, > - int flags, int *pcr) > +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, > + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int > *pcr) { > struct ima_rule_entry *entry; > int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); > @@ -374,7 +377,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum > ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) > continue; > > - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask)) > + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, func, mask)) > continue; > > action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; > @@ -691,6 +694,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct > ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") > == 0) entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; > + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") > == 0) > + entry->func = CREDS_CHECK; > else if (strcmp(args[0].from, > "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") == 0) > entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK; > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h > b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 0a721c110e92..8d532c3557b5 > 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -48,10 +48,14 @@ > #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 > #define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000 > #define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000 > +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00004000 > +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00008000 Is this correct, that the IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE and IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED same as IMA_READ_APPRAISE and IMA_READ_APPRAISED? > #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | > IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ > - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | > IMA_READ_APPRAISE) > + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | > IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \ > + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE) > #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | > IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ > - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | > IMA_READ_APPRAISED) > + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | > IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \ > + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED) > > enum evm_ima_xattr_type { > IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, > @@ -109,6 +113,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { > enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; > enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; > enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4; > + enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4; > enum integrity_status evm_status:4; > struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; > }; -- Best regards, Mikhail Kurinnoi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy 2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi @ 2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> wrote: > ? Mon, 16 Oct 2017 13:37:09 -0700 > Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> ?????: >> #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 >> #define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000 >> #define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000 >> +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00004000 >> +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00008000 > > Is this correct, that the IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE and IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED > same as IMA_READ_APPRAISE and IMA_READ_APPRAISED? Definitely not correct, good catch. I'll resend with that fixed if people feel this approach is reasonable. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi @ 2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-18 20:59 ` Matthew Garrett 1 sibling, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Mimi Zohar @ 2017-10-17 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 13:37 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > static int __init init_ima(void) > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 95209a5f8595..c9d5735711eb 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -247,10 +247,9 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) > * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. > */ > static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > - enum ima_hooks func, int mask) > + const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func, > + int mask) > { > - struct task_struct *tsk = current; > - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > int i; > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && > @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > case LSM_SUBJ_USER: > case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: > case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: > - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid); > rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, > rule->lsm[i].type, > Audit_equal, By replacing the call from security_task_getsec() to security_cred_getsecid(), I assume you're expecting different results. ?Will this change break existing IMA policies? Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy 2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar @ 2017-10-18 20:59 ` Matthew Garrett 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-18 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 12:07 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 13:37 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: >> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: >> - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); >> + security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid); >> rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, >> rule->lsm[i].type, >> Audit_equal, > > By replacing the call from security_task_getsec() to > security_cred_getsecid(), I assume you're expecting different results. > Will this change break existing IMA policies? No, for BPRM_CHECK they'll use the same creds that were previously checked. CREDS_CHECK will behave differently to BPRM_CHECK. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook 2017-10-16 20:37 [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-16 21:58 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-10-18 21:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore 2 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-10-16 21:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On 10/16/2017 1:37 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the > bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid > hook that makes this possible. Why do you want the secid? What are you planning to do with it? > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> > Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org > Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> > Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > security/security.c | 7 +++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ > security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index ce02f76a6188..48a929fd47e6 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -556,6 +556,10 @@ > * @new points to the new credentials. > * @old points to the original credentials. > * Transfer data from original creds to new creds > + * @cred_getsecid: > + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c > + * @p contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. > + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > * @kernel_act_as: > * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). > * @new points to the credentials to be modified. > @@ -1510,6 +1514,7 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp); > void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > + void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); > @@ -1783,6 +1788,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct list_head cred_free; > struct list_head cred_prepare; > struct list_head cred_transfer; > + struct list_head cred_getsecid; > struct list_head kernel_act_as; > struct list_head kernel_create_files_as; > struct list_head kernel_read_file; > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 458e24bea2d4..8d969958c25e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); > void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); > int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); > void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 55b5997e4b72..0f5784880c94 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1009,6 +1009,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); > } > > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); > + > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) > { > return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 33fd061305c4..e0828e9130c7 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3829,6 +3829,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > *tsec = *old_tsec; > } > > +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + rcu_read_lock(); > + *secid = cred_sid(c); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > +} > + > /* > * set the security data for a kernel service > * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled > @@ -6332,6 +6339,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > index 6a71fc7831ab..5af7b7e709bc 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > @@ -391,6 +391,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t > return skp; > } > > +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_cred(const struct cred *c) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp; > + > + rcu_read_lock(); > + skp = smk_of_task(c->security); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return skp; > +} > + Don't put a one-use function in the header file. Code it directly in smack_cred_getsecid(). You're doubling the size of the code and obscuring it doing it this way. > /* > * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob. > */ > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 463af86812c7..f1710cf76f7f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2080,6 +2080,19 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > /* cbs copy rule list */ > } > > +/** > + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure > + * @c: the object creds > + * @secid: where to put the result > + * > + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. > + */ > +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_cred(c); > + *secid = skp->smk_secid; > +} > + > /** > * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials > * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. > @@ -4684,6 +4697,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook 2017-10-16 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Casey Schaufler @ 2017-10-18 21:01 ` Matthew Garrett 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-18 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > On 10/16/2017 1:37 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: >> For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the >> bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid >> hook that makes this possible. > > Why do you want the secid? What are you planning to do with it? See the following patch - IMA policy allows the admin to restrict appraisal to executables running in specific security contexts. However, right now the check at application execution time ends up using the current task creds before the new creds are committed. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook 2017-10-16 20:37 [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Casey Schaufler @ 2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore 2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Paul Moore @ 2017-10-23 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> wrote: > For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the > bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid > hook that makes this possible. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> > Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org > Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> > Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > security/security.c | 7 +++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ > security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+) No argument from me on the SELinux/LSM bits: Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index ce02f76a6188..48a929fd47e6 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -556,6 +556,10 @@ > * @new points to the new credentials. > * @old points to the original credentials. > * Transfer data from original creds to new creds > + * @cred_getsecid: > + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c > + * @p contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. > + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > * @kernel_act_as: > * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). > * @new points to the credentials to be modified. > @@ -1510,6 +1514,7 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp); > void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > + void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); > @@ -1783,6 +1788,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct list_head cred_free; > struct list_head cred_prepare; > struct list_head cred_transfer; > + struct list_head cred_getsecid; > struct list_head kernel_act_as; > struct list_head kernel_create_files_as; > struct list_head kernel_read_file; > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 458e24bea2d4..8d969958c25e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); > void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); > int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); > void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 55b5997e4b72..0f5784880c94 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1009,6 +1009,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); > } > > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); > + > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) > { > return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 33fd061305c4..e0828e9130c7 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3829,6 +3829,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > *tsec = *old_tsec; > } > > +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + rcu_read_lock(); > + *secid = cred_sid(c); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > +} > + > /* > * set the security data for a kernel service > * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled > @@ -6332,6 +6339,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > index 6a71fc7831ab..5af7b7e709bc 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > @@ -391,6 +391,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t > return skp; > } > > +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_cred(const struct cred *c) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp; > + > + rcu_read_lock(); > + skp = smk_of_task(c->security); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return skp; > +} > + > /* > * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob. > */ > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 463af86812c7..f1710cf76f7f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2080,6 +2080,19 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > /* cbs copy rule list */ > } > > +/** > + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure > + * @c: the object creds > + * @secid: where to put the result > + * > + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. > + */ > +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_cred(c); > + *secid = skp->smk_secid; > +} > + > /** > * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials > * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. > @@ -4684,6 +4697,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), > -- > 2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog > -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook @ 2017-10-19 23:14 Matthew Garrett 2017-10-19 23:32 ` Casey Schaufler 0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-19 23:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org --- V2: incorporate Casey's requested change include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/security.c | 7 +++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index c9258124e417..c28c6f8b65dc 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -554,6 +554,10 @@ * @new points to the new credentials. * @old points to the original credentials. * Transfer data from original creds to new creds + * @cred_getsecid: + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c + * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). * @new points to the credentials to be modified. @@ -1507,6 +1511,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); + void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); @@ -1779,6 +1784,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head cred_free; struct list_head cred_prepare; struct list_head cred_transfer; + struct list_head cred_getsecid; struct list_head kernel_act_as; struct list_head kernel_create_files_as; struct list_head kernel_read_file; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ce6265960d6c..14848fef8f62 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4bf0f571b4ef..02d217597400 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1004,6 +1004,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); } +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); + int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f5d304736852..1d11679674a6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3836,6 +3836,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) *tsec = *old_tsec; } +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + rcu_read_lock(); + *secid = cred_sid(c); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled @@ -6338,6 +6345,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 286171a16ed2..ed1bbf201e2f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2049,6 +2049,20 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) /* cbs copy rule list */ } +/** + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure + * @c: the object creds + * @secid: where to put the result + * + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. + */ +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + rcu_read_lock(); + *secid = smk_of_task(c->security); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + /** * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. @@ -4651,6 +4665,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), -- 2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook 2017-10-19 23:14 Matthew Garrett @ 2017-10-19 23:32 ` Casey Schaufler 0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-10-19 23:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On 10/19/2017 4:14 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the > bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid > hook that makes this possible. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> > Cc: selinux at tycho.nsa.gov > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org > Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> > Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org > --- > V2: incorporate Casey's requested change > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > security/security.c | 7 +++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++++++ > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index c9258124e417..c28c6f8b65dc 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -554,6 +554,10 @@ > * @new points to the new credentials. > * @old points to the original credentials. > * Transfer data from original creds to new creds > + * @cred_getsecid: > + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c > + * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. > + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > * @kernel_act_as: > * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). > * @new points to the credentials to be modified. > @@ -1507,6 +1511,7 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > gfp_t gfp); > void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > + void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); > @@ -1779,6 +1784,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct list_head cred_free; > struct list_head cred_prepare; > struct list_head cred_transfer; > + struct list_head cred_getsecid; > struct list_head kernel_act_as; > struct list_head kernel_create_files_as; > struct list_head kernel_read_file; > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index ce6265960d6c..14848fef8f62 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); > void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); > int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); > void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 4bf0f571b4ef..02d217597400 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1004,6 +1004,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); > } > > +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); > + > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) > { > return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index f5d304736852..1d11679674a6 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3836,6 +3836,13 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > *tsec = *old_tsec; > } > > +static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + rcu_read_lock(); > + *secid = cred_sid(c); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > +} > + > /* > * set the security data for a kernel service > * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled > @@ -6338,6 +6345,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 286171a16ed2..ed1bbf201e2f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2049,6 +2049,20 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) > /* cbs copy rule list */ > } > > +/** > + * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure > + * @c: the object creds > + * @secid: where to put the result > + * > + * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. > + */ > +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) > +{ > + rcu_read_lock(); > + *secid = smk_of_task(c->security); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > +} > + smk_of_task does not return a u32, it returns a pointer to a struct smack_known. You want +static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + skp = smk_of_task(cred->security); + *secid = skp->smk_secid; + rcu_read_unlock(); +} > /** > * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials > * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. > @@ -4651,6 +4665,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-10-23 23:20 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 11+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2017-10-16 20:37 [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 21:03 ` Mikhail Kurinnoi 2017-10-16 21:20 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-17 19:07 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-10-18 20:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-16 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook Casey Schaufler 2017-10-18 21:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2017-10-23 23:20 ` Paul Moore -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2017-10-19 23:14 Matthew Garrett 2017-10-19 23:32 ` Casey Schaufler
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